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Implementing the FRAND Standard
in China
Jyh-An Lee*
ABSTRACT

The modern world relies on technical standards, most of which
involve standard-essentialpatents (SEPs). To balance SEP holders'fair
compensation with standard implementers' access to standardized
technologies, standard-settingorganizations (SSOs) generally require
that their members commit to license their SEPs on a fair, reasonable,
and non-discriminatory (FRAND) basis.
In recent years, the
communications industry has seen a growing amount of litigation
concerning SEPs and FRAND in many jurisdictions. As China has
grown into a majorplayer and market in the worldwide communications
business, its public policy, court decisions, and private business
strategies concerning SEPs and FRAND are likely to have a huge global
impact in the high-technology sector. The high-profile Huawei v. IDC is
the first Chinese court decision ruling on FRAND-encumbered SEPs
issues. This is also the first Asian case in which the court determined a
FRAND royalty rate to calculate the fee paid by the standard
implementer to the SEP holder. Based on the Chinese government's
policy toward technical standards and the case of Huawei, this Article
identifies two distinguishing features in China's encounter with
*
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standard-related issues. The first is the active role played by the
government in domestic standard-settingactivities, while the second is
Chinese courts' civil law approach, associated with good faith, to the
enforcement of FRAND commitments. Based on a comparative and
critical viewpoint, this Article uses Huawei as an example to illustrate
the challenges and perplexities for the judicial determination of a
FRAND rate. The reasoning in Huawei is far from sufficient and
satisfactory, and it is unclear whether the Chinese courts are tasked to
implement the government's industrialpolicy. Nonetheless, Huawei did
identify some crucial factors concerning FRAND and SEPs, and it has
had a significant impact on Chinese related standard-settingactivities.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Technical standards have become a core component of a variety
of information-communication-technology (ICT) products.' Each of
these products may use hundreds of standards, each with thousands of
patents in it.2 Currently, most standard-setting organizations (SSOs)
require their members to license standard-essential patents (SEPs)
under fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. 3 SEPs
cover inventions that are necessary to comply with a technical standard
and are particularly important in the communications industry. Some
complicated legal issues concerning SEPs and FRAND have been the
focus of recent patent and antitrust scholarship. These include, but are
not limited to, antitrust and competition law concerns, 4 injunction
issues,5 the determination of the FRAND rate, 6 and dispute resolution

1.
See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING IN
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY 18-19
(2013) [hereinafter NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING];
RON SCHNEIDERMAN, MODERN STANDARDIZATION: CASE STUDIES AT THE CROSSROADS OF
TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 1-2 (2015); Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND's

&

Forever: Standards, Patent Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231, 237-38
(2014); Daryl Lim, Standard Essential Patents, Trolls, and the Smartphone Wars: Triangulating
the End Game, 119 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2014) [hereinafter Lim, StandardEssential Patent].
2.
Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based
Patent Licensing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 47, 49 (2013) [hereinafter Contreras, Fixing FRAND].
3.
See infra note 35 and accompanying text. The term FRAND is sometimes used
interchangeably with RAND (reasonable and nondiscriminatory). They have the same meaning in
the realm of SEP licensing. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Allan L. Shampine, An Economic
Interpretationof FRAND, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 531, 531 n.1 (2013) [hereinafter Carlton
Shampine, Economic InterpretationofFRAND]; Jorge L. Contreras & Richard J. Gilbert, A Unified
Framework for RAND and Other Reasonable Royalties, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1447, 1453-54
(2015) [hereinafter Contreras & Gilbert, A Unified Framework for RAND]; Thomas F. Cotter,
Comparative Law and Economics of Standard-EssentialPatents and FRAND Royalties, 22 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 311, 312 (2014); Kassandra Maldonado, Note, BreachingRAND and Reaching
for Reasonable: Microsoft v. Motorola and Standard-EssentialPatent Litigation, 29 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 419, 419 n.6 (2014).
4.
See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2012); Rambus,
Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Philippe Chappatte, FRAND Commitments-The Case
for Antitrust Intervention, 5 EUR. COMPETITION J. 319, 319 (2009); Cotter, Standard-Essential

Patents, supra note 3, at 327-42; Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Baumol, Reasonable and
Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties, Standards Selection, and Control of Market Power, 73
ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2005); Xiuting Yuan & Paul Kossof, Developments in Chinese Anti-Monopoly
Law: Implications of Huawei v. InterDigital on Anti-Monopoly Litigation in Mainland China, 37
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 438 (2015).
5.
See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 3, at 320-27; Paul Nihoul, Injunctions on Standard
EssentialPatents:In Search ofA "ClearBrightLine", 6 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 151 (2015).
6.
See, e.g., Damien Geradin, The Meaning of "Fairand Reasonable" in the Context of
Third-PartyDeterminationof FRAND Terms, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 919 (2014)
[hereinafter Geradin, The Meaning of "Fairand Reasonable'.
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mechanisms for SEP holders and standard implementers.7 These
issues are of great importance to the ICT industry, especially for
Courts and
manufacturers of mobile or smartphone devices.8
competent authorities in many jurisdictions around the world have had
to cope with this series of legal problems. 9 As standards have global
scope, those legal problems are often transnational. 10
China's policy toward SEPs has evolved in a way that
demonstrates sensitivity to the international norms and various
stakeholders in the standards environment." As China has grown into
a major market in the worldwide communications business, its public
policy, court decisions, and private business strategies concerning SEPs
and FRAND are likely to have a global impact in the high-technology
sector. 12 This is why some researchers claim that "what happens in
China on FRAND will impact decision-making in the boardrooms of
Silicon Valley." 13 The recent Chinese case Huawei v. IDC1 4 represents
an important judicial development that has drawn global attention.
Like most FRAND disputes, where standard implementers claim that
See generally Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting
7.
ReasonableRoyalties for Standard-EssentialPatents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135 (2013) (stating
that courts have to interpret FRAND commitments) [hereinafter Lemley & Shapiro, Setting
Reasonable Royalties].
See, e.g., Enrico Bonadio, StandardizationAgreements, Intellectual Property Rights
8.
and Anti-competitive Concerns, 3 QUEEN MARYJ. INTELL. PROP. 22, 25-26 (2013); Thomas H. Chia,
Note, Fightingthe Smartphone Patent War with RAND-Encumbered Patents, 27 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 209, 213 (2012); Contreras, Fixing FRAND, supra note 2, at 48; Cotter, supra note 3, at 313;
Geradin, The Meaning of "Fairand Reasonable", supra note 6, at 924, 942-43; Kirti Gupta,
Technology Standards and Competition in the Mobile Wireless Industry, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV.
865, 874-77 (2015); Maldonado, supra note 3, at 420; Daniel S. Sternberg, A Brief History of RAND,
B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 211, 234 (2014).
See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 3, at 312; Leon B. Greenfield et al., SEP Enforcement
9.
Disputes Beyond the Water's Edge: A Survey of Recent Non- U.S. Decisions, 27 ANTITRUST 50 (2013);
Lim, Standard Essential Patent, supra note 1, at 9; Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Standard-Essential
4,
L.
SEC.
ANTITRUST
2014
A.B.A.
International Landscape,
Patents: The
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/key-speeches-presentations/standardessential-patents-thejintl_1andscape.pdf [https://perma.cc/LDK4-DTKA].
10.
See, e.g., Julian M. Beach, Note, Transatlantic(F)RANDs and Converging Standards:
Finding Balance Between Jurisdictions in International Standard Setting, 54 COLUM. J.

TRANSNAT'L L. 454, 459 (2016); see also Matthew Norris, Note, Blocking Blocks at the Border:
Examining Standard-EssentialPatent Litigation Between Domestic Companies at the ITC, 98
MINN. L. REV. 713, 741 (2013) (noting the international SEP cases handled by the International
Trade Commission).
11.

See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING,

supra note 1, at 132.
Daniel Sokol & Wentong Zheng, FRAND in China, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 71, 7312.
74 (2013) [hereinafter Sokol & Zheng, FRAND in China].
Id. at 74.
13.
Huawei Jishu Youxian Gongsi Su Jiaohu Shuzi Tongxin Youxian Gongsi
14.
([Huawei Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Communications, Inc. (Huawei
(T
v. IDC)], 2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305 (Guangdong High People's Ct. 2013) (China).
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the patentees have breached the FRAND terms and courts are asked to
determine the reasonable royalty rate, 15 the Chinese courts in Huawei
were asked to make a substantive judgment regarding the patentee's
violation of FRAND commitments and the reasonable royalty.1 6 This is
the first court decision that ruled on the rate for a FRAND-encumbered
SEP in China.1 7 This Article uses the Huawei case as a lens to
understand China's current judicial policy toward FRAND and SEPs,
the challenges it faces, and the implications for SEP holders as well as
standard implementers.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I provides an overview
of SEP and FRAND. It briefly introduces the concept of standards,
SEPs, the function of FRAND generally, and relevant developments in
China specifically.
Standard-setting activities in China are
characterized by strong government involvement. Part II offers the
background, key issues, and an overview of the Huawei case. Part III
explores the enforcement mechanism for FRAND in China. The
Chinese courts have carved out their own way, based on the principles
of fairness and good faith, to enforce SEP holders' FRAND
commitments.1 8 As the application of a good faith doctrine is closely
related to local business practices, norms, or even moral standards,19 it
is sometimes difficult for foreign SEP holders to understand how this
doctrine can become the mechanism to enforce FRAND commitments. 20
Moreover, this Article analyzes the differences in the good faith
principle between Chinese law and American law in the context of
FRAND-encumbered SEPs. The Chinese courts apply good faith to
establish an independent legal basis for FRAND obligation, 21 whereas

15.
See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, Setting ReasonableRoyalties, supra note 7, at 1160.
16.
2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305.
17.
See, e.g., Guangliang Zhang & Gary Zhang, A Review of Huawei v IDC, MANAGING
INTELL. PROP. (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.managingip.com/Article/3440420/A-review-of-Huaweiv-IDC.html [https://perma.cc/58Z2-KFWD]. After Huawei v. IDC, there is an ongoing patent
litigation initiated by Qualcomm against Meizu, an Alibaba invested smartphone maker, in Beijing
Intellectual Property Court, regarding the infringement of the former's 3G and 4G SEPs. See, e.g.,
He Huifeng, SmartphoneMaker Meizu Seeks Review of Qualcomm License Deals Amid US Giant's
Patent Lawsuit, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POsT (June 28, 2016), http://www.scmp.com/tech/chinatech/article/1982746/smartphone-maker-meizu-seeks-review-qualcomm-license-deals-amid-us
[https://perma.cclMFP5-62V7]; Juro Osawa, Qualcomm Sues Alibaba-Backed Smartphone Maker
Meizu for Patent Infringement, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/qualcomm-sues-alibababacked-smartphone-maker-meizu-for-patent-infringement- 1466766395 [https://perma.cc/KB9SFMZ7] (last updated June 26, 2016).
18.
See infra notes 133-83 and accompanying text.
19.
See, e.g., BING LING, CONTRACT LAW IN CHINA 49-50 (2002).
20.

Cf. PITMAN B. POTTER, THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: GLOBALIZATION AND LOCAL

LEGAL CULTURE 43 (2001) (indicating that the way Chinese courts interpret the doctrine of good
faith is unfamiliar to foreigners).
21.
See infra notes 107-33 and accompanying text.
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good faith in the US context is incidental to the contractual
relationship. 22 Part IV discusses the judicial determination of FRAND
violations and the appropriate FRAND rate. It investigates the main
issues from a comparative perspective, comparing approaches taken by
the US courts and the Chinese Huawei court. Many similarities and
nuances between the US and Chinese approaches to FRAND and SEPs
are illustrated therein. Some critical issues in the Huawei decision are
These issues include the timing of the
also analyzed in depth.
to what extent a previous transaction and
and
negotiation
hypothetical
its royalty rate can be viewed as a comparable one for FRAND
determination. Part V concludes with the lessons that we can learn
from Huawei, including the unique approach to SEP under Chinese law,
its strengths and weaknesses, and the growing importance of Chinese
court decisions in the global high-tech industry.

II. SEP AND FRAND
Standards or technical standards are "any set of technical
specifications that either provide or are intended to provide a common
design for a product or process." 23 Standards can foster innovation and
competition significantly. 2 4 Standardization provides huge benefits to
both consumers and manufacturers. 25 It ensures that a variety of
different products from different manufacturers can interoperate
smoothly. 26 Standards enable consumers to enjoy various compatible
products, and manufacturers benefit from massive commercial

22.
23.

See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations,

90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1896 (2002); see also NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PATENT CHALLENGES FOR

STANDARD-SETTING, supra note 1, at 1 ("Standards are technical specifications describing means
of achieving certain beneficial features of products and services.").
24.
See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 33-56 (2007),

Fei
[https://perma.cc/9G3W-78ZW];
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf
Deng, Determining the FRAND Rate: U.S. Perspectives on Huawei v. InterDigital,COMPETITION
POL'Y INT'L, (Feb. 12, 2014), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/determining-thefrand-rate-u-s-perspectives-on-huawei-v-interdigital
[https://perma.cc/EZ6Y-363W];
Lim,
StandardEssentialPatent, supra note 1, at 3.
See, e.g., Bonadio, supra note 8, at 24-25; Geradin, The Meaning of "Fairand
25.
Reasonable", supra note 6, at 933; Kesan & Hayes, supra note 1, at 237-38.
26.

See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING,

supra note 1, at 1; Carlton & Shampine, Economic Interpretationof FRAND, supra note 3, at 534;
Contreras & Gilbert, A Unified Framework for RAND, supra note 3, at 1453; Lemley, supra note
23, at 1896; Lim, StandardEssential Patent, supra note 1, at 3; Srividhya Ragavan et al., FRAND
v. CompulsoryLicensing: The Lesser of the Two Evils, 14 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 83, 86 (2015); Sokol
& Zheng, FRAND in China, supra note 12, at 71.
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opportunities. 27
Devices including telephones, USBs, computers,
smartphones, and tablets all involve different technical standards. 28
Therefore, standards have become an essential part of our daily lives
and the world of rapid technological progress. 29
Standard-setting organizations (SSOs) are organizations whose
primary activities are developing, coordinating, promulgating, and
revising technical standards that are intended to address the needs of
a wide range of implementers and consumers. 30
SSOs play an
important role in coordinating various demands from developers and
manufacturers.3 1 This Part will briefly introduce the concepts of SEPs
and FRAND resulting from relevant standard-setting activities, both
generally and in China specifically.

A. SEPs and FRAND in General
Implementing a standard sometimes requires employing certain
patents when standard implementers cannot design around the patents
or cannot choose an alternative technology to replace these patents. 32
These patents are the so-called SEPs. 33 Standardization and the
market demand for interoperability enabled by standards can lead to a
higher probability of infringing SEPs, on which more manufacturers
need to build their products. 34 Currently, in their patent or intellectual
27.
See, e.g., Bonadio, supra note 8, at 24-25; Geradin, The Meaning of "Fairand
Reasonable", supra note 6, at 933; Kesan & Hayes, supra note 1, at 237-38.
28.
See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and
Other Patent Pledges, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 479, 480 (2015) [hereinafter Contreras, Market Reliance
Theory]; Contreras, Fixing FRAND, supra note 2, at 47; Lemley, supra note 23, at 1896; Lim,
Standard EssentialPatent, supra note 1, at 3.
29.
See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 23, at 1896.
30.
See, e.g., id. at 1892-93; see also Bonadio, supra note 8, at 24; Stbphanie ChuffartFinsterwald, PatentMarkets: An Opportunity for Technology Diffusion and FRAND Licensing?, 18
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 335, 347 (2014); Ragavan et al., supra note 26, at 87; Sternberg, supra

note 8, at 212, 223-24.
31.
See, e.g., Geradin, The Meaning of "Fairand Reasonable", supra note 6, at 933; Lim,
Standard Essential Patent, supra note 1, at 10-11; see also MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK
ECONOMY: How Too MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES

196 (2008) ("With SSOs, each player knows that individual investments will be complementary
with the products made by others.").

&

32.
See, e.g., Maldonado, supra note 3, at 432; Ragavan et al., supra note 26, at 88;
Maurice Schellekens, Horizon 2020 and Fair and Reasonable Licenses, 21(8) COMPUTER
TELECOMM. L. REV. 234, 234-35 (2015); see also Lim, Standard Essential Patent, supra note 1, at
4 ("When a standard becomes ubiquitous, ... using an alternative standard may not be an option.").
33.
See, e.g., Contreras, Fixing FRAND, supra note 2, at 50-51; Lemley & Shapiro,
Setting ReasonableRoyalties, supra note 7, at 1136; Maldonado, supra note 3, at 419; James Ratliff
& Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Use and Threat of Injunctions in the RAND Context, 9 J. COMPETITION
L. & ECON. 1, 3 (2013).
34.
See, e.g., Lim, Standard EssentialPatent, supra note 1, at 20.
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property (IP) policies, most SSOs require their members to license any
SEPs to other members on FRAND terms. 35 FRAND is designed to
balance the interests of SEP holders and standard implementers by
ensuring the former's fair compensation and the latter's access to the
standard. 36 On the one hand, the FRAND rate should be high enough
so that inventors' incentives to develop new technologies will not be
hampered. 37 On the other hand, SEP holders are obliged to FRAND
commitment so that implementers can legally employ the SEPs without
the risk of infringement, 38 being locked in by the SEPs, 3 9 or losing their
standard-specific investments.40
It is widely believed that the purpose of FRAND terms is to
prevent the "hold-up problem," 4 1 wherein SEP holders withhold a
license until an implementer agrees to pay an unduly high royalty rate
Because implementers will have invested
for the patent. 42

35.

See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING,

&

supra note 1, at 1; Carlton & Shampine, Economic Interpretationof FRAND, supra note 3, at 53132; Contreras, Fixing FRAND, supra note 2, at 51, 55; Cotter, supra note 3, at 311-12; Layne
Keele, Holding Standards for Randsome: A Remedial Perspective on RAND Licensing
Commitments, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 187, 190-91 (2015); Kesan & Hayes, supra note 1, at 233, 238;
Lemley & Shapiro, Setting Reasonable Royalties, supra note 7, at 1136-37; Doug Lichtman,
Understanding the RAND Commitment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2010); Lim, Standard
Essential Patent, supra note 1, at 9-10; Maldonado, supra note 3, at 419; Ragavan et al., supra
note 26, at 86-87; Ratliff & Rubinfeld, supra note 33, at 4; Sokol & Zheng, FRAND in China, supra
note 12, at 71.
See, e.g., Geradin, The Meaning of "Fairand Reasonable", supra note 6, at 922, 932,
36.
938; Gupta, supra note 8, at 868; Lim, StandardEssentialPatent, supra note 1, at 41; Maldonado,
supra note 33, at 422-25; J. Gregory Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part II: Injunctions, 11 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 201, 211-12 (2015).
See, e.g., In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL
37.
5593609, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C1O-1823JLR, 2013
WL 2111217, at *12 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013); Sidak, supra note 36, at 212.
Maldonado, supra note 3, at 426.
38.
Lim, StandardEssentialPatent, supra note 1, at 42.
39.
Carlton & Shampine, Economic Interpretationof FRAND, supra note 3, at 535-36;
40.
Contreras, Fixing FRAND, supra note 2, at 56-57; Lim, StandardEssential Patent, supra note 1,
at 29; Sidak, supra note 36, at 211-12; see also Contreras & Gilbert, A Unified Framework for
RAND, supra note 3, at 1488 ("SEPs should not benefit from switching costs that arise from
investments that are specific to the standard.").
Patent hold-up problems take place when a patent holder refuses to license a patent
41.
on expected terms, and, therefore, holds up the progress of the diffusion of new technologies. See
Robert P. Merges & Jeffrey M. Kuhn, An Estoppel Doctrinefor Patented Standards, 97 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 10, 49 (2009).
42.
See, e.g., Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *12 (W.D. Wash. Apr.
25, 2013); Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Casting A FRAND Shadow: The Importance of Legally
Defining "Fairand Reasonable"and How Microsoft v. Motorola Missed the Mark, 22 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 235, 244 (2014); Carlton & Shampine, Economic Interpretationof FRAND, supra note
3, at 534; Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in Standard
Setting and Antitrust Through A Historic Lens, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 39, 42 (2015); Contreras
Gilbert, A Unified Framework for RAND, supra note 3, at 1456; Contreras, Fixing FRAND, supra
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substantially in developing products based on the specific standard, it
is quite expensive to opt out of the standard. 43 Consequently, SEP
holders enjoy an advantageous position in negotiations associated with
licensing the subject patents to other entities due to the SSOs' adoption
decision, rather than the incremental value of those patents. 44 Some
researchers believe that standardization may enable SEP owners to
demand an excessive license rate, which may be "as much as 100 times
the adjudicated value of the technology." 45 Professors Colleen V. Chien
and Mark A. Lemley correctly pointed out that the hold-up problem is
particularly harmful to industries that produce multicomponent
products, of which only a small part is claimed by patent holders for
infringement. 46 Smartphone and mobile products are in precisely such
an industry.
Although FRAND provisions are quite common in SSOs' IP
policies, none of these policies define what is "fair" or "reasonable."47
The FRAND commitment is, therefore, viewed as an "incomplete
contract."4 8 Although some scholars suggest the incompleteness of

note 2, at 49-51; Gupta, supra note 8, at 866, 882; Keele, supra note 35, at 189; Mark A. Lemley
& Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2007); Lim,
Standard EssentialPatent, supra note 1, at 4, 29; Maldonado, supra note 3, at 428; Ragavan et al.,
supra note 26, at 89-90; Sidak, supra note 36, at 211.
43.
See, e.g., Contreras, Fixing FRAND, supra note 2, at 48-49; Lim, StandardEssential
Patent, supra note 1, at 3.
44.
See, e.g., Contreras & Gilbert, A Unified Frameworkfor RAND, supra note 3, at 1456;
Contreras, Fixing FRAND, supra note 2, at 50-51; Maldonado, supra note 3, at 428; see also Anne

Layne-Farrar, A. Jorge Padilla & Richard Schmalensee, PricingPatentsfor Licensing in StandardSetting Organizations:Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 672 (2007)
(indicating that FRAND mechanism is designed to avoid the abuse of market power brought by
the standard); Ratliff & Rubinfeld, supra note 33, at 3.
45.
Lim, Standard EssentialPatent, supra note 1, at 4.
46.
Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest,
98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 39 (2012).
47.
See, e.g., RUDI BEKKERS & ANDREW UPDEGROVE, A STUDY OF IPR POLICIES AND
PRACTICES OF A REPRESENTATIVE GROUP OF STANDARDS SETTING ORGANIZATIONS WORLDWIDE

102-03
(2012),
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGAlstep/PManagement/PGA072197
[https://perma.cc/A6N7-GSNV]; Carlton & Shampine, Economic Interpretationof FRAND, supra
note 3, at 532; Contreras & Gilbert, A Unified Framework for RAND, supra note 3, at 1454;
Contreras, Fixing FRAND, supra note 2, at 51; Lemley, supra note 23, at 1913-14, 1964-65;
Lichtman, supra note 35, at 1031; Ragavan et al., supra note 26, at 90-91; see also Cotter, supra
note 3, at 312 (stating that SSOs are not obliged to define FRAND); Kesan & Hayes, supra note 1,
at 245 (claiming that "the SSO generally provides no guidance for what terms will be acceptable"
for FRAND commitment); Maldonado, supra note 3, at 419-20 (describing "the lack of guidance as
to what 'reasonable' licensing means").

48.
See, e.g., Geradin, The Meaning of "Fairand Reasonable," supra note 6, at 922; Lim,
Standard Essential Patent, supra note 1, at 22; Joanna Tsai & Joshua D. Wright, Standard
Setting, Intellectual PropertyRights, and the Role ofAntitrust in Regulating Incomplete Contracts,
80 ANTITRUST L.J. 157, 162-64 (2015); see also Maldonado, supra note 3, at 427 (stating that
contract does not answer the questions "What is reasonableness? Who determines reasonableness?
How is reasonableness determined?").
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FRAND is necessary and desirable for negotiations between SEP
holders and standard implementers,4 9 controversies occasionally occur
when a standard implementer fails to reach an agreement regarding
the FRAND rate with the SEP holder.5 0 The central disputes are
primarily about whether the rates offered by the SEP holder are
consistent with its FRAND commitment.5 1 If not, the dispute then
centers on how a court should decide the FRAND rate for both parties. 52
B. SEPs and FRAND in China
Unlike the western world, where standard setting involves a
high degree of market-driven private ordering, 53 the Chinese
government has played an active role in relevant standards activities.
In China, national standards are supervised by the Standardization
Administration of China (SAC) under the General Administration of
Quality Supervision, Inspection, & Quarantine (AQSIQ) of the State
Council. 54 At the sector level, standard-setting is overseen by relevant
government industries or the Ministry of Industry and Information
Technology (MIIT). 55 The government's active role demonstrates its
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, F. Scott Kieff & Daniel F. Spulber, The FTC, IP, and
49.
SSOs: Government Hold-Up Replacing Private Coordination,8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 12
(2012); Geradin, The Meaning of "Fairand Reasonable," supra note 6, at 930 (arguing that such
incompleteness is inevitable and beneficial).
50.
See, e.g., Ichiro Nakayama & Yoshiyuki Tamura, Denial of Injunctive Relief on
Grounds of Equity: Situation in the U.S. and Japan, in COMPULSORY LICENSING-PRACTICAL
EXPERIENCES AND WAYS FORWARD 267, 285 (Reto M. Hilty & Kung-Chung Liu eds., 2015).

See, e.g., Contreras, Fixing FRAND, supra note 2, at 52-54; Deng, supra note 24;
51.
Geradin, The Meaning of "Fairand Reasonable," supra note 6, at 940-41; see also Lim, Standard
EssentialPatent, supra note 1, at 5 ("When disputes occur, they reveal a stark disparity of views
on the meaning of FRAND obligations."); Maldonado, supra note 3, at 420 (describing "a flood of
litigation seeking to define what constitutes reasonable royalty rates").
See, e.g., Lichtman, supra note 35, at 1032; see also Kesan & Hayes, supranote 1, at
52.
239 ("SSOs adopt vague language requiring fairness and reasonableness, leaving it to the courts
to determine what license terms would be fair and reasonable.").
See, e.g., Alden F. Abbott, US Government Antitrust Intervention in Standard-Setting
53.
Activities and the Competitive Process, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 225, 232 (2016); Allensworth,
supra note 42, at 236; see also Contreras, Fixing FRAND, supra note 2, at 47 ("Most of the
thousands of technical standards currently deployed throughout the world were developed
collaboratively by market participants in voluntary standard-development organizations.");
Gupta, supra note 8, at 866 ("A broad variety of firms collaborate to develop common technology
standards . . . ."); Kesan & Hayes, supra note 1, at 237 (stating that SSOs are voluntary collectives
representing private companies).
54.

See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING,

supranote 1, at 123-25; Sokol & Zheng, FRAND in China, supra note 12, at 80; Jun Su & Vladislav
V. Fomin, Balancing Public and Private Interests in ICT Standardisation: The Case of AVS in
China, in WHAT KIND OF INFORMATION SOCIETY? GOVERNANCE, VIRTUALITY, SURVEILLANCE,

SUSTAINABILITY, RESILIENCE 69 (Jacques Berleur, Magda David Hercheui & Lorenz M. Hilty eds.,
2010).

55.

Sokol & Zheng, FRAND in China, supra note 12, at 80.

2016]

IMPLEMENTING THE FRAND STANDARD

47

intention to inject industrial policy considerations into standard-setting
activities.5 6 As setting up national standards has become an important
policy goal in China, 57 the Chinese government has made it clear in its
policy plan that indigenous technologies should take precedence in
being adopted into the Chinese standards.5 8 Consequently, it is not
surprising that foreign enterprises have experienced difficulties in
participating in the standard-setting activities in China. 59 Some
foreign companies also have concerns about inadequate IP protection in
those Chinese standard-setting activities.60
The first FRAND provision adopted in the private sector in
China appeared in the intellectual property rights policy of the Audio
Video Coding Standard Working Group in China (AVS). 61 AVS is an
important SSO in China. Twenty percent of its members are public
institutions, including universities and research institutes.62 Members
of AVS are required to make ex ante FRAND or royalty-free
commitments. 63 AVS's FRAND or royalty-free requirement was later
adopted by other SSOs in China, such as the China Electronic
Standardization Institute (CESI). 64 The active involvement of public
institutions partly explains the industrial policy considerations in
standard-setting activities.
By fostering endogenous standards, the Chinese government
aims to advance the nation's technological capability and develop new
talent for future development. 65 However, as standards involve the
interaction between domestic companies and the global market,
domestic policy toward standards may not be sufficient to foster
industrial development. Accordingly, in 2006, China submitted a
position paper to the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade 2006
56.

Id. at 81.

57.

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING, supra note

1, at 123.
58.
59.

Sokol & Zheng, FRAND in China, supra note 12, at 82.
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING, supra note

1, at 128-89.
60.
Id. at 129; see also Ruth Taplin, Cross-Border Intellectual Property and Theoretical
Models, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INNOVATION AND MANAGEMENT IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 1,

7 (Ruth Taplin & Alojzy Z. Nowak eds., 2010) (noting that foreign companies may be forced to
transact their patents without fair and reasonable treatment in the indigenous-based standard-

setting activities in China).
61.

1, at 126.
62.
63.

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING, supra note

Su & Fomin, supra note 54, at 67-68.
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING, supra note

1, at 126-27; Su & Fomin, supranote 54, at 67-68.
64.

1, at 127.
65.

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING, supra note

See, e.g., Su & Fomin, supra note 54, at 69.
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("TBT Committee") in the World Trade Organization (WTO),
highlighting the potential negative impact of intellectual property on
standardization. 6 6
III. BACKGROUND OF HUAWEi V. IDC

Huawei is a Chinese company with its headquarter in
Shenzhen. 6 7 It is one of the largest telecommunications equipment and
device producers in the world. 68 InterDigital Communications (IDC)6 9
is a non-practicing entity (NPE) 70 whose business model is primarily
based on licensing patents for 2G, 3G, and 4G devices, and the IEEE802
standard, rather than the manufacture of products.7 1 In September
2009, IDC joined an SSO, the European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI), and committed to licensing its SEPs on FRAND
terms. 72 IDC also owns SEPs in China's wireless communications
standards (WCDMA, CDMA2000, and TD-SCDMA standards). 73 Since

Peter Yu, The First Decade of TRIPs in China, in CHINA AND GLOBAL TRADE
66.
GOVERNANCE: CHINA'S FIRST DECADE IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 126, 131-32 (Zeng Ka

& Wei Liang eds., 2014).
67.
See, e.g., Adam Pasick, The World's Third-Largest Smartphone Maker Is Weirdly
Cagey About Its Progress Outside of China, QUARTZ (July 29, 2014), http://qz.com/241746/theworlds-third-largest-smartphone-maker-is-weirdly-cagey-about-its-progress-outside-of-china/
[https://perma.cc/98EB-EMX4]; Andrew Stevens, China's Silicon Valley, CNN (Sept. 23,
http://money.cnn.com/2016/05/20/technology/china-tech-huawei-campus-life/
2016),
[https://perma.cc/9GC5-66HR].
68.

Huawei,

WIKIPEDIA,

[https://perma.cc/77SZhttps://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Huawei&oldid=700203172
J8UD] (last visited Jan. 17, 2016).
It should be noted that there were four defendants in this case: InterDigital
69.
Communications, Inc.; InterDigital Technology Corporation; InterDigital Patent Holdings Inc.;
and IPR Licensing Inc., which are affiliated with one another. In this Article, following the term
used in the Huawei decision, I use "IDC" to denote all four of these defendants. See Huawei Jishu
R01"
Youxian Gongsi Su Jiaohu Shuzi Tongxin Youxian Gongsi (WiMO
([Huawei Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Communications, Inc. (Huawei v. IDC)], 2013 Yue Gao Fa Min
San Zhong Zi No. 305 (Guangdong High People's Ct. 2013) (China).
NPEs or patent assertion entities (PAEs) are companies that profit from asserting
70.
patents without making or selling products. See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Our Divided Patent
System, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1129 (2015); Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Unpacking Patent
Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649, 650 (2014); Stefania Fusco, Markets and Patent
Enforcement: A Comparative Investigation of Non-PracticingEntities in the United States and
Europe, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 439, 443-44 (2014); Camilla A. Hrdy,
CommercializationAwards, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 13, 35 (2015); Eric Rogers & Young Jeon, Inhibiting
Patent Trolling: A New Approach for Applying Rule 11, 12 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 291, 293
(2014); Aria Soroudi, Defeating Trolls: The Impact of Octane and Highmar on Patent Trolls, 35
LOy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 319, 320 (2015).
See 2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305.
71.
72.

Id.

73.

Id.
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November 2008, Huawei has had several negotiations with IDC
regarding the license royalties for those SEPs.7 4
IDC first sued Huawei and other telecommunications
companies, including Nokia and ZTE, in the US Federal District Court
of Delaware and the International Trade Commission (ITC) in 2011 and
2012, claiming infringement of its 3G telecom patents.7 5 In addition to
damages claims, IDC sought not only preliminary and permanent
injunctions from the district court but also exclusion orders from ITC
against Huawei. 76 In December 2011, Huawei, in turn, filed two
lawsuits against IDC in the Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court.7 7
In the first lawsuit, Huawei alleged that IDC had been abusing its
dominant market position through a number of unlawful practices, such
as differentiated pricing, tying-in, and refusal to deal.78

Huawei

claimed damages of 20 million Renminbi (RMB). 79 In the second case,
Huawei sued IDC for violating its FRAND obligations.8 0 The first case
was primarily associated with China's Anti-Monopoly Law, whereas the
second dealt with a more fundamental issue regarding the legal
mechanism to enforce FRAND commitment and judicial determinations
of the FRAND rate, which are the focus of this Article.
The Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court ruled on February 4,
2013, that IDC had violated its FRAND obligations and that the
licensing rate paid by Huawei for IDC's 2G, 3G, and 4G SEPs should
not exceed 0.019 percent of the actual sales prices of Huawei's wireless
devices.81 Then both Huawei and IDC appealed to the Guangdong High

74.
See, e.g., Zhang & Zhang, supra note 17.
75.
US patent numbers 7349540, 7502406, 7536013, 7616070, 7706332, 7706830, and
7970127. See 2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305. On December 19, 2013, ITC ruled that
IDC's alleged patents are either invalid or not infringed. See Certain Wireless Devices with 3G
Capabilities and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-800, (Dec. 19, 2013) (Notice),
http://usitc.gov/secretary/fed-reg-notices/337/337_800_noticel2192013sgl.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/TK3C-YUWMI.
76.
2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305.
77.
See CPI, Huawei v. InterDigital:China at the CrossroadsofAntitrust and Intellectual
Property, Competition and Innovation, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L (Dec. 3, 2013)
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/huawei-v-interdigital-china-at-the-crossroads-ofantitrust-and-intellectual-property-competition-and-innovation/ [https://perma.cc/RL8L-SBKR].
78.
Huawei Jishu Youxian Gongsi Su Jiaohu Shuzi Tongxin Youxian Gongsi
(
[Huawei Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Communications, Inc. (Huawei
v. IDC)], 2011 Shen Zhong Fa Zhi Min Chu Zi No. 858 (Shenzhen Interm. People's Ct. 2011)
(China).
79.
Id.
80.
Huawei Jishu Youxian Gongsi Su Jiaohu Shuzi Tongxin Youxian Gongsi
(
[Huawei Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Communications, Inc. (Huawei
v. IDC)], 2011 Shen Zhong Fa Zhi Min Chu Zi No. 857 (Shenzhen Interm. People's Ct. 2011)
(China).
81.
See CPI, supra note 77.
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People's Court (the "Huawei court"). 82 On October 16, 2013, the
Guangdong High People's Court upheld the Shenzhen Intermediate
People's Court's decision regarding IDC's violation of its FRAND
obligation and the determination of the licensing rate as 0.019
percent. 83 This Huawei decision is of great importance to understand
judicial practices with regard to FRAND-encumbered SEPs in China.
The Huawei decision was not published until April 2014.84
Before the decision was published, relevant scholarly analysis could
only be based on secondary sources, such as papers written by the
judges sitting in the Huawei court and IDC's SEC filings.8 5 As to the
other interrelated case associated with Anti-Monopoly Law, both the
Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court and the Guangdong High
People's Court applied Article 50 of the Anti-Monopoly Law and decided
that IDC should be liable for the damages in the amount of RMB 20
million because IDC's monopolistic conduct caused Huawei to suffer
such loss.

86

Table 1: Huawei v. IDC Cases
Claims

Abuse of Dominant
Market Positions

Violation of FRAND
commitment and
Determination of FRAND Rate

Shen Zhong Fa Zhi Min Chu Zi

Shen Zhong Fa Zhi Min Chu Zi

No. 858 (2011)

No. 857 (2011)

Second Instance:

Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi

Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi

Guangdong High

No. 306 (2013)

No. 305 (2013)

First Instance:
Shenzhen
Intermediate

People's Court

People's Court

Huawei Jishu Youxian Gongsi Su Jiaohu Shuzi Tongxin Youxian Gongsi
82.
[Huawei Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Communications, Inc. (Huawei
(W1W1.
v. IDC)], 2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305 (Guangdong High People's Ct. 2013) (China).
Id.
83.
Wong-Ervin, supra note 9, at 11 (noting the April 2014 decision was not published in
84.
full due to IDC's trade secret concerns).
85.
See, e.g., Sokol & Zheng, FRAND in China, supra note 12, at 88.
Huawei Jishu Youxian Gongsi Su Jiaohu Shuzi Tongxin Youxian Gongsi
86.
[Huawei Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Communications, Inc. (Huawei
(
v. IDC)], 2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 306 (Guangdong High People's Ct. 2013) (China).
Evidence of IDC's abuse of its dominant position can be drawn from the fact that it requested
excessive royalties from Huawei and demanded that Huawei and its affiliated companies provide
free patent cross-licenses globally. Id.
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To solve these issues, it was necessary for the Shenzhen
Intermediate People's Court and the Guangdong High Court to answer
a series of legal questions. First, the courts had to decide whether they
had jurisdiction over a dispute concerning foreign owners of SEPs and
a commitment made to a foreign SSO.87

The courts also needed to

decide whether Chinese law should be applied when the subject SSO's
Intellectual Property Policy refers to French law.8 8 In substance, the
courts had to find a correct legal basis for IDC's FRAND obligation.8 9
The most difficult part was then whether (and, if so, how) IDC breached
its FRAND commitment, and how the court could determine an
appropriate FRAND rate. 90 This Article primarily focuses on the
substantive legal issues underlying Huawei's complaint regarding
IDC's FRAND obligations and the determination of the FRAND rate for
SEPs.
IV. ESTABLISHING THE FRAND OBLIGATION UNDER CHINESE LAW

Jurisdictions may have quite different approaches to the legal
effect of a FRAND commitment. 91 One of the notable issues in Huawei
is the determination of an appropriate legal basis for Huawei to claim
a FRAND rate against IDC. In all cases involving FRAND and SEPs,
standard implementers need to find an enforcement mechanism to hold
SEP holders to their obligation to license such patents under FRAND
terms. In this case, IDC argued that its FRAND commitment was just
an invitation for license negotiation, rather than an obligation to form
the contractual relationship. 92 As such, IDC denied any legally binding
bases for FRAND and contended that the courts could not create the
contractual relationship between the two parties. 93 Huawei, on the
other hand, insisted that IDC was obliged to license its SEPs under
FRAND terms, regardless of whether that was based on contract, their
FRAND commitment, or the doctrine of fairness and good faith in
Chinese law. 94 The courts, therefore, had to look into all these claims

87.
88.
89.

See id.
Id.
Id.

90.

Id.

91.

Kesan & Hayes, supra note 1, at 233.

92.

Huawei

Jishu Youxian Gongsi Su Jiaohu Shuzi Tongxin Youxian Gongsi
[Huawei Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Communications, Inc. (Huawei
v. IDC)], 2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305 (Guangdong High People's Ct. 2013) (China).
93.
Id.
94.
Id.
(W
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and explore whether there was an appropriate legal basis for SEP
holders' FRAND commitments in China. 95
A. Contract Between SEP Holders and Implementers
Some scholars attempt to view a FRAND commitment as an
implied license to all implementers so that patent holders have "a
contractual claim for royalty, not a cause of action for patent
infringement that might result in an injunction, treble damages, and
attorneys' fees." 96 Chinese IP scholar Cui Guobin likewise suggests that
it is possible that IDC and Huawei had already entered into a license
He interprets IDC's FRAND
agreement before negotiation.9 7
commitment to ETSI as an offer, and Huawei could accept the offer by
notifying IDC of its plan to implement the subject standard. 98 In this
way, Huawei could claim the FRAND rate against IDC based on their
contract. The recognition of a license agreement between Huawei and
IDC may be based on the opinion of the Supreme People's Court
expressed in an official reply to a lower court:
In view of the actual situation that the standard-setting body in China has not established
relevant rules on the public disclosure and use of patent information in a relevant

standard, if a patentee has participated in setting a standard or has agreed to include its
patent into a state, industry, or local standard, it shall be deemed that the patentee has
permitted others to exploit such a patent while implementing the standard. Therefore,
exploitation of the subject matter by others shall not constitute infringement prescribed
in Article 11 of the Patent Law. The patentee may require the entity exploiting the patent
99
to pay a royalty, which, nonetheless, shall be obviously less than a normal royalty.

This opinion only allows patentees to charge implementers "a
royalty . . . obviously less than a normal royalty."1 00 Because such a
royalty is not reasonable, fair, and non-discriminatory, it can hardly be
viewed as a FRAND royalty. It should be noted that a FRAND rate is
normally determined from a hypothetical voluntary transaction; 101
therefore, a royalty rate obviously less than a normal one cannot be a
This Supreme People's Court opinion reflects the
FRAND rate.
government's favoring of standard implementers and a policy against
95.
Zhong Lun Law Firm, Seeking Injunctions for StandardEssential Patents in China,
LEXOLOGY (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.lexology.comflibrary/detail.aspx?g=d2c6e034-3544-4b6ebb29-55be99235ffe [https://perma.cc/9FDT-68UV].
96.
See, e.g., Lemley, supranote 23, at 1925.
97.
Cui Guobin, Standard-EssentialPatents and Injunctive Relief, in PATENT LAW IN
GREATER CHINA 340, 347 (Stefan Luginbuehl & Pater Ganea eds., 2014).
98.
Id. at 348-49.
99.

Letter

of

the

Supreme

People's

Court,

PKULAW.CN,

(last
[https://perma.cc/BNB5-S68E]
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=110288&lib=law
visited Oct. 17, 2016).
Id.
100.
See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, Setting Reasonable Royalties, supra note 7, at 1146.
101.
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fair compensation for SEP holders. 102 In addition, in this reply, the
Supreme People's Court stated that "it shall be deemed that the
patentee has permitted others to exploit such a patent" and "[t]he
patentee may require the entity exploiting the patent to pay a
royalty." 103 Although the People's Supreme Court did not explicitly
state that there is a licensing agreement between the patentee and the
standard implementer, it seems to suggest that such an agreement does
exist because the "patentee has permitted," and "the entity exploiting
the patent" is, therefore, obliged to pay, the royalty. 104 Such an
interpretation conflicted with a widely accepted principle that SEP
holders' FRAND commitments to an SSO are just promises to license to
other members, rather than licenses themselves. 105 As a FRAND pledge
does not include a specific license fee or royalty rate, it cannot be an
offer made by SEP holders.10 6 For example, a Dutch court made it clear
in a 2012 decision that a SEP holder's FRAND commitment to SSOs
does not constitute a license between the SEP holder and standard
implementers. 107 Similarly, in Huawei, both first-instance and secondinstance courts ruled out the possibility that Huawei requested a
FRAND licensing rate based on its contract with IDC.108 The courts
stated that there was no contractual relationship between Huawei and
IDC, and such a relationship would only be formed after they reached a
consensus over the license rates and other licensing terms. 109 In other
words, there was no contractual basis for Huawei to claim a FRAND
licensing rate against IDC.

102.
Such a policy can also be observed in SAC's regulations for national standards. Article
9 of the "Regulations on Administration of Formulating and Revising National Standards
Involving Patents" stipulates that "a national standard cannot include any patented technology
unless the patent holder agrees to grant licenses with royalties considerably lower than the
customary license fee or with no royalties at all." See Taplin, supra note 60, at 6.
103.
Letter of the Supreme People's Court, supra note 101.
104.
Id. It should be pointed out that this reply concerned a case where the patent owner
had not made a FRAND commitment to the SSO. See Li Zhongsheng & Lei Peng, The AntiMonopoly Risks of Asserting Standard Essential Patents in China, KING & WOOD MALLESONS
(Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.kwm.com/en/cn/knowledge/insights/standard-essential-patent-ofantitrust-risk-analysis-20150818 [https://perma.cc/ENB3-M3AM].
105.
See, e.g., Kesan & Hayes, supra note 1, at 260; Lemley & Shapiro, Setting Reasonable
Royalties, supra note 7, at 1140-41; Lim, StandardEssentialPatent, supra note 1, at 29.
106.
Schellekens, supra note 32, at 239.
107.
Cotter, supra note 3, at 318.
108.
Huawei Jishu Youxian Gongsi Su Jiaohu Shuzi Tongxin Youxian Gongsi
i
)[Huawei Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Communications, Inc. (Huawei
v. IDC)], 2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305 (Guangdong High People's Ct. 2013) (China).
109.
Id.
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B. Contract with Third-PartyBeneficiary
The other option for enforcing FRAND commitment is to define
IDC's agreement with ETSI as a contract with a third-party
beneficiary. 110 Put more clearly, this approach suggests that IDC
entered into a binding contractual commitment with ETSI, agreeing to
license its SEPs on FRAND terms,1 11 and Huawei is a third-party
beneficiary of IDC's commitments to ETSI. 112 A contract with a thirdparty beneficiary has been common practice to cope with FRANDencumbered SEPs in the United States. 113 Two court decisions in the
United States provide examples of this approach. 1 14 In Microsoft v.
Motorola,1 15 the US court held that Microsoft was a third-party
beneficiary of Motorola's FRAND commitments to the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and ETSI, which were
enforceable contracts. Therefore, Microsoft was entitled to sue for
breach of the FRAND contract. 116 As the district court's Judge Robart
explained: "[The FRAND] commitments are clearly designed to benefit
potential licensees of Motorola's standard essential patent by ensuring
that such patents are readily accessible to everybody at reasonable
rates."11 7 The court thus rejected Motorola's statement that the IEEE
and International Telecommunications Union (ITU) commitments were
merely unilateral offers to negotiate reasonable and non-discriminatory
(RAND) licenses. 118 Motorola was, therefore, obliged to grant Microsoft
a FRAND license, not permitted merely "to engage in bilateral, good-

Cui, supra note 98, at 349.
110.
The contractual nature of FRAND commitment has been recognized by numerous
111.
court decisions and academic articles in the United States. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola,
Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 2012); Research in Motion Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d
788, 797 (N.D. Tex. 2008), Ericsson, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:06-CV-63, 2007 WL 1202728,
at *1 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2007); Cotter, supra note 3, at 313, 315-19; Keele, supranote 35, at 19496; Lemley & Shapiro, Setting Reasonable Royalties, supranote 7, at 1141; Mark A. Lemley, Ten
Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (And One Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 155-58
(2007); Ragavan et al., supra note 26, at 93-94; Ratliff & Rubinfeld, supranote 3333, at 4; supra
note 2626Sidak, supra note 36, at 210; Sternberg, supra note 8, at 225.
Yang Li & Nari Lee, European Standards in Chinese Courts - A Case of SEP and
112.
FRAND disputes in China, in GOVERNANCE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA AND

EUROPE 281 (Nari Lee, Niklas Brunn & Mingde Le eds., 2016).
See, e.g., Contreras, Market Reliance Theory, supra note 28, at 483-84; Ragavan et
113.
al., supra note 26, at 98-99.
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1033 (W.D. Wash. 2012);
114.
Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1083 (W.D. Wis. 2012).
Microsoft, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 1033.
115.
Id.
116.
Id.
117.
Id. at 1032.
118.
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faith negotiations leading to [F]RAND terms." 119 In Apple, Inc. v.
Motorola Mobility, Inc., 120 Judge Crabb similarly concluded that, by
committing to FRAND terms to ETSI and IEEE, Motorola had made a
contractual commitment to license its SEPs on FRAND terms to thirdparty beneficiaries, including Apple.
If the SEP holder's FRAND
commitment constitutes a binding contract, then it becomes crucial for
the court to carefully read the language of SSOs' Intellectual Property
Right policies so that it can determine what an SEP holder's FRAND
obligations are.
According to Chinese contract law, parties may agree that one
party shall perform its obligation to a third party. 121 Based on the
majority and authoritative interpretation of Chinese contract law, a
third party can claim the contractual right against the obligor although
it is not a contracting party1 22 and although the third party's right is
not independent from the original contracting parties. 123 In Huawei,
some Chinese scholars suggest that, although the contractual relation
took place between ETSI and IDC, Huawei, as a third-party beneficiary,
could still request a FRAND rate from IDC. 12 4 However, China derived
its civil law, including contract law, from the German system. 125
Therefore, the way that German courts and scholars interpret contract
law has a significant impact on Chinese contract law. 126 In Germany,

119.
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2012 WL 4827743, at *6 (W.D.
Wash. Oct. 10, 2012).
120.
Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1085 (W.D. Wis. 2012).
121.
Contract Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by Nat'l People's Cong.,
Mar. 15, 1999), art. 64, 1999 P.R.C. CONTRACT LAW (China) ("Where the parties prescribed that
the obligor render performance to a third person, if the obligor fails to render its performance to

the third person, or rendered non-conforming performance, it shall be liable to the obligee for
breach of contract.").
122.

See, e.g., MO ZHANG, CHINESE CONTRACT LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 319 (2006); Cui,

supra note 99, at 350-51.
123.
See, e.g., Hector L. MacQueen, Third Party Rights in Contract: A Case Study on
Codifying and Not Codifying, in TOWARD A CHINESE CIVIL CODE: COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL

PERSPECTIVE 307, 324 (Lei Chen & C.H. (Remco) van Rhee eds., 2012).
124.
Cui, supra note 98, at 349-50.
125.
See, e.g., 3 ZHU JINGWEN & HAN DAYUAN, RESEARCH REPORT ON THE SOCIALIST LEGAL
SYSTEM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS, 51 (2013); ZHANG XIAOYANG, CHINESE CIVIL LAW FOR

BUSINESSES 21, 30 (2013); ZHANG, supra notel24, at xi; Tianshu Zhou & Mathias Siems,
Contentious Modes of UnderstandingChinese Commercial Law, 6 GEO. MASON J. INT'L COM. L.
177, 179-80 (2015).
126.
See, e.g., Jianlin Chen, Challenges in Designing PublicProcurement Linkages: A Case
Study of SMES Preferencein China's Government Procurement, 30 UCLAPAC. BASIN L.J. 149, 179
(2013) (stating that the applicability of Contract Law to government procurement in China reflects
the German approach); Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711,
718-19 (1994) (noting how Chinese jurists understand formal law via German legal system); Wang
Liming, An Inquiry into Several Difficult Problems in Enacting China's Uniform Contract Law, 8
PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 351, 354-55, 385 (1999) (exemplifying how a Chinese civil law and contract
law scholar analyzed Chinese law via German approach).
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the courts have made it clear that SEP holders' FRAND commitments
do not grant other SSO members a right to obtain a license, and the
FRAND commitment is nothing but an invitation for third parties to
make offers. 127 In Huawei, IDC also cited a German court decision to
dissuade the court from holding that Huawei was a third-party
beneficiary to the contract between IDC and ETSI. 128 While the Huawei
court did not view Huawei as a third-party beneficiary, it did not
explain that decision. 129 One possible explanation is that in Chinese
contract law, contracting parties cannot impose any obligation on the
third and a third-party beneficiary will obtain purely benefit without
any obligation. The third party only receives obligor's performance and
is not subject to any contractual obligation. 130 However, in the SEPs
scenario, standard implementers still need to pay SEP holders a royalty
based on FRAND terms. Therefore, such an arrangement cannot be a
contract with a third-party beneficiary under Chinese law.
C. Doctrines of Fairnessand Good Faith
As there are some legislative ambiguities in third-party
beneficiary provisions in Chinese Contract Law, some researchers have
suggested that the application of the good faith doctrine may fill the
loopholes. 131 The Huawei court eventually ruled that the legal basis for
Huawei to request that IDC provide a FRAND rate was the doctrine of
fairness and good faith prescribed in the General Principles of Civil Law
and Chinese Contract Law. 132 The court also identified three statutes
from these two bodies of law as the legal basis for Huawei's FRAND
claim against IDC: 13 3

(1) Article 4 of the General Principles of Civil Law: "In civil
activities, the principles of voluntariness, fairness,
consideration for equal value, and good faith shall be
observed."1 34

127.
128.
(

v. IDC)],
129.
130.
Mar. 15,
131.
132.
133.
134.
the Nat'l

Cotter, supra note 3, at 318.
Huawei Jishu Youxian Gongsi Su Jiaohu Shuzi Tongxin Youxian Gongsi
[Huawei Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Communications, Inc. (Huawei
2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305 (Guangdong High People's Ct. 2013) (China).
Id.
Contract Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by Nat'l People's Cong.,
1999), art. 64, 1999 P.R.C. CONTRACT LAW (China).
See, e.g., MacQueen, supranote 124, at 324-25.
2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305.
Id.
General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by
People's Cong., Apr. 12, 1986), art. 4, 1986 P.R.C. CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAWS (China).
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(2) Article 5 of the Chinese Contract Law: "The parties shall
observe the principle of fairness in defining each other's
rights and obligations." 13 5
(3) Article 6 of the Chinese Contract Law: "The parties shall
observe the principle of good faith in exercising their rights
and fulfilling their obligations." 1 3 6
These three articles lay out fundamental principles for all civil
and commercial activities in China. The Huawei court ruled that IDC's
FRAND obligation to Huawei could be established by applying the three
Articles to construct the scope and effect of IDC's FRAND
commitment. 137 It is not surprising that the Huawei court applied the
General Principles of Civil Law and Chinese Contract Law to solve the
issues surrounding FRAND-encumbered patents because intellectual
property (IP) laws in China have always been viewed as part of the civil
law system, and relevant civil code can, therefore, be applied to IP
disputes. 138 In addition, the Huawei dispute originated from IDC's
contracts with SSOs. 13 9 As in most civil law countries, fairness and,
especially, good faith are overriding principles that govern all private
activities in China. 140 "Good faith" in Chinese refers to "honesty"
(chengshi) and "faithfulness" (xinyong).141 It implies the reasonable
expectations of the parties, a proper balance of different interests, and
the reasonable commercial standard for fair dealing.142
The
implementation of this principle requires parties to ensure fairness in
civil activities and to avert the abuse of rights. 143 Therefore, Chinese
scholars view the principle of fairness as "subsumed under the principle
135.
Contract Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by Nat'l People's Cong.,
Mar. 15, 1999), art. 5, 1999 P.R.C. CONTRACT LAW (China).
136.
Contract Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by Nat'1 People's Cong.,
Mar. 15, 1999), art. 6, 1999 P.R.C. CONTRACT LAW (China).
137.
2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305.
138.
See, e.g., Liming Wang, The Systematization of the Chinese Civil Code, in TOWARD A
CHINESE CIVIL CODE: COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 21, 27 (Lei Chen & C.H.

(Remco) van Rhee eds., 2012).
139.
See supranotes 71-73 and accompanying text.
140.

See, e.g., EJAN MACKAAY, LAW AND ECONOMICS FOR CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS 432-33

(2013); ZHANG, supra note 123, at 75-76; ZHU & HAN, supra note 126, at 17; REINHARD
ZIMMERMANN & SIMON WHITTAKER, GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 49-56 (2000);

Chunlin Leonhard, A Legal Chameleon:An Examinationof the Doctrine of Good Faith in Chinese
and American Contract Law, 25 CONN. J. INT'L L. 305, 306 (2010); Wang Liming & Xu Chuanxi,
Fundamental Principles of China's Contract Law, 13 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 16 (1999); Saul
Litvinoff, Good Faith, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1646-47, 1655 (1997).
141.
See, e.g., LING, supra note 19, at 52; ZHANG, supra note 127, at 26.
142.
See, e.g., LING, supra note 19, at 54.
143.
See, e.g., Hui Zheng, Overview, in CHINESE CIVIL LAW 1, 5 (Yuanshi Bu ed., 2013).
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of good faith." 144 Moreover, FRAND rightfully echoes the principle of
fairness in Chinese law as fairness is an essential component of a
FRAND commitment.
Chinese scholars and courts have viewed the doctrine of good
faith as the "highest guiding principle," "imperial principle," or "royal
principle" for the law of obligation. 145 Chinese courts tend to use the
doctrine as a catchall tool to solve all civil law and contract-related
issues. 146 The doctrine has been used to fill the legislative loopholes in
all stages of a.potential contractual relationship, including pre-contract
and postmodification, termination,
formation, performance,
termination.14 7
1. Promise at the Pre-Contract Phase
Because the Huawei court ruled out the possibility of a license
agreement between Huawei and IDC during their negotiations, it
needed to investigate whether IDC had the FRAND duty without a
license agreement with Huawei. In such a scenario, SEP holders'
previous FRAND commitments with SSOs should be an important
factor to be considered in the application of the good faith doctrine. As
the Chinese courts have widely adopted this doctrine to hold parties
liable during the pre-contract phase 48 and to validate the binding effect
of previous promises, 149 it is quite natural and logical for the Huawei
court to hold IDC obliged to license on FRAND terms based on the
doctrine of good faith. Although the Huawei court did not specify, based
on the doctrine of good faith, the duty that IDC as a SEP holder owed
to a standard implementer, it is generally accepted in China that
parties during the negotiation stage should bear the duties of loyalty,

See, e.g., LING, supra note 19, at 50.
144.
145.
See, e.g., id. at 50, 52; Leonhard, supra note 141, at 309. Sometimes good faith is
termed as "honesty and credibility" or "honesty and faithfulness" in Chinese. See, e.g., LING, supra
note 19, at 52; ZHANG, supra note 123, at 76. Some researchers use the term "principle of integrity"
to denote the good faith principle. See, e.g., ZHU & HAN, supra note 127, at 17.
See, e.g., Leonhard, supra note 140, at 316-17; see also POTTER, supra note 20, at 43
146.
(describing the principles of honesty and good faith as part of the gap-filling provisions); ZHANG,
supra note 123125, at 26 ("in the context of [the good faith] doctrine that judges construe the law,
especially when legal vacua require the interpretation of the law pursuant to the spirit of good
faith"); ZHU & HAN, supra note 126, at 17 (stating that the principle of good faith or integrity "can
plug loopholes and realize the creativity and flexibility of judicial activities").
See, e.g., ZHANG, supra note 123, at 76-77; Leonhard, supra note 141, at 308, 310-11,
147.
317; Wang & Xu, supranote 141, at 17-21.
See, e.g., LING, supra note 19, at 50; Leonhard, supra note 140, at 317-18; see also
148.
Cotter, supra note 3, at 326 (introducing the opinion of the Tokyo District Court, which held that
based on the good faith doctrine, Apple and Samsung should negotiate with good faith for FRAND
rate).
See, e.g., LING, supra note 19, at 56.
149.
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honesty, non-deception, confidentiality, and, most importantly, duty to
keep promises.15 0 If the court viewed IDC's offer as excessively high, it
could rule that the company violated good faith doctrine by breaking its
FRAND promise.
From a comparative perspective, some US scholars have
proposed to establish a mechanism to enforce FRAND commitments
based on promissory or equitable estoppel doctrine.
This would
similarly require the patent holder's promise or statement and the
standard adopter's reliance. 15 1 These proposals, however, were not
adopted by the US courts. Promissory estoppel is the American common
law approach to deciding whether to impose precontractual liability in
the absence of an agreement. 152 Nonetheless, the concept of estoppel
does not exist in China and other civil law systems. 153 Therefore,
experiences from other civil law jurisdictions are noteworthy for the
discussion of FRAND enforcement in China, especially with the view
whether they similarly apply the doctrine of good faith in FRAND
disputes.
The Tokyo District Court in Japan, whose civil law
jurisdiction has had a huge influence on the Chinese private law
regime, 154 once recognized that the principle of good faith should be
applied to parties engaging in contract negotiations, including those

150.
See, e.g., Wang & Xu, supra note 140, at 17-19; see also Funing Huang, Formation
and Validity of Contracts, in CHINESE CIVIL LAW 37, 48 (Yuanshi Bu ed., 2013) (explaining that
pre-contractual duties based on the principle of good faith include negotiating in good faith and
the duty of cooperation); ZHANG, supra note 123, at 85 (introducing the pre-contractual liability
based on the principle of good faith in China). In some other jurisdictions, courts will also hold
parties liable if the party "breaks off negotiations in a manner contrary to precontractual good
faith." See Martijn W. Hesselink, The Concept of Good Faith, in TOWARD A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE
471, 479 (Ewoud Hondius ed., 3d ed. 2004).
151.
See, e.g., Contreras, Market Reliance Theory, supra note 28, at 516-17, 521-23; Kesan
& Hayes, supra note 1, at 263-64; Lemley, supra note 23, at 1918; Sidak, supra note 36, at 22324.
152.
See, e.g., Nadia E. Nedzel, A Comparative Study of Good Faith, Fair Dealing, and
PrecontractualLiability, 12 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 97, 128-36 (1997).
153.
See, e.g., David V. Snyder, Comparative Law in Action: Promissory Estoppel,
the Civil Law, and the Mixed Jurisdiction, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 695, 695 (1998); see also
Rodrigo Novoa, Note, Culpa in Contrahendo:A Comparative Law Study: Chilean Law and the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 22 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 583, 592 (2005) ("In a civil law system, the duty to bargain in good faith is
unanimously recognized either by statutory law or as a general principle of law as pre-contractual
obligation. But in a common law system, this duty is not generally acknowledged. Some courts and

scholars have recognized it as a general principle of law, but others have only accepted it as a
contracual obligation or under the theory of promissory estoppel.").
154.
See, e.g., ZHANG, supra note 123, at xi; see also Jan Krauf3, Equitable Doctrines in
InternationalPatent Laws, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW 99-100,

116, 117 (Toshiko Takenaka ed., 2013) (indicating that civil law jurisdictions use "general clauses,"
such as good faith, to cope with equity issues, and that enforcement of a patent under German law
is limited by the doctrine of good faith, which is perceived as a doctrine of equity).
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involving FRAND-encumbered SEPs. 155 The Tokyo District Court,
therefore, ruled that SEP holders should honestly disclose appropriate
information to substantiate their offers upon the request of standard
implem enters. 156

2. Abuse of Legal Right
The good faith doctrine is applied to curb the abuse of legal
rights as well.15 7
In the context of FRAND-encumbered SEPs,
patentees are sometimes viewed as abusing their patent rights at the
expense of standard implementers. 15 8
Such abuse of right is
occasionally found when a SEP holder who previously made a FRAND
commitment seeks an injunction against the implementer. 159 As a
FRAND commitment, by its nature, is a promise not to exercise the full
scope of patent rights in exchange for the standard adoption,1 60 the
enforcement of SEPs by injunction or litigation, especially during
negotiations, may constitute an abuse of rights. From a comparative
perspective, the Ninth Circuit in Microsoft viewed the FRAND
commitment as the SEP holders' implicit waiver of injunctive relief and
reached a conclusion similar to Huawei that they are not allowed to
seek injunctions against standard implementers. 16 1
SEP holders such as IDC, on the other hand, may always argue
that based on freedom of contract, they should have freedom to enter
into a license agreement, the freedom to choose with whom to sign the
155.
See, e.g., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 48.5d1 n.191.1 (2016) (citing Tokyo district court cases); Cotter,
Standard-EssentialPatents, supra note 3, at 325-26; Nakayama & Tamura, supra note 50, at 286.

156.
Cotter, supra note 3, at 326.
157.
See, e.g., LING, supra note 19, at 50; ZHU & HAN, supra note 125, at 17; Hui Zheng,
Overview, in CHINESE CIVIL LAW 1, 5 (Yuanshi Bu ed., 2013).
Cotter, supra note 3, at 324-26.
158.
159.
See, e.g., Steven Anderman, A Comparative Law Perspective II: The Relationship
&

Between Patents and CompetitionRules, in THE UNITARY EU PATENT SYSTEM 143 (Justine Pila

Christopher Wadlow eds., 2015); Nakayama & Tamura, supra note 50, at 285; see also Alison
Jones, Standard-EssentialPatents:FRAND Commitments, Injunctions and the Smartphone Wars,

10 EUR. COMPETITION J. 1, 10-13 (2014) (noting that courts in Netherlands, Italy, and France
declined to grant injunctions to SEPs holders; whereas the German courts are more likely to grant
such injunctions).
160.
See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 7, at 1140.
161.
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 2012) ("Implicit in such
a sweeping promise is ... a guarantee that the patent-holder will not take steps to keep would-be
users from using the patented material, such as seeking an injunction, but will instead proffer
licenses consistent with the commitment made."); see also Sternberg, supra note 8 at 225
(interpreting FRAND obligation as a "waiver of a party's rights to . . . inunctions and treble
damages). But see Lim, StandardEssential Patent, supra note 1, at 60 (criticizing Ninth Circuit's
opinion and stating that "the idea that the right to injunctive relief extinguished every time a SEP
is at issue is a step too far"); Sternberg, supra note 8, at 242 ( "[A] [F]RAND obligation should not
foreclose the possibility of an injunction").
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license agreement, and the freedom to decide the content and form of a
license agreement. 162 However, the freedom of contract is limited by the
principle of good faith 163 because of policy concerns arising from
asymmetric bargaining power or unfair clauses. 164 Additionally,
technical standard and FRAND-encumbered SEPs involve not only the
private interests of both parties but also the public interest. 165 The
principle of good faith in China was designed precisely to balance the
interests of the parties and society. 166 Therefore, a FRAND violation
may be an appropriate case in which to apply the doctrine of good faith.
3. Good Faith in Civil Law and Common Law Jurisdictions
The good faith doctrine also has its place in the US common law
system. 167 However, compared to the widely adopted good faith doctrine
in Chinese law, the application of good faith in US law is much more
limited.1 6 8 In the context of FRAND, good faith in the US common law
needs to be implied in the contract. 169 In Microsoft v. Motorola,170 the
district court and the Ninth Circuit held that Motorola's dealing with
Microsoft regarding enforcing a FRAND-encumbered patent violated
the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 17 1 However, different from
Huawei, which applied the good faith doctrine directly to establish
IDC's FRAND obligation to the standard implementer Huawei, the
district court and the Ninth Circuit first defined Microsoft as a thirdparty beneficiary to Motorola's contractual FRAND commitments to the
IEEE and ITU. 172 The courts held that such contracts are subject to
common law obligations of good faith and fair dealing. 173 Put

162.
See e.g., General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China
(promulgated by the Nat'l People' Cong., Apr. 12, 1986), 1986 P.R.C. CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAWS,
art. 4 ("In civil activities, the principles of voluntariness, fairness, making compensation for equal
value, honesty and credibility shall be observed."); Contract Law of the People's Republic of China
(promulgated by Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 15, 1999), art. 4, 1999 P.R.C. CONTRACT LAw (China)
("A party is entitled to enter into a contract voluntarily under the law, and no entity or individual
may unlawfully interfere with such right."); LING, supra note 19, at 43; ZHANG, supra note 123, at
25.
163.
See, e.g., LING, supra note 19, at 49-50.
164.
See, e.g., Maud Piers, Good Faith in English Law-Could A Rule Become A Principle?,
26 TUL. EuR. & Civ. L.F. 123, 161-62 (2011).
165.
See supra notes 24-29, 36-42 and accompanying text.
166.
See, e.g., LING, supra note 19, at 53-54; ZHANG, supra note 123, at 76.
167.
See, e.g., Leonhard, supra note 140, at 311-15.
168.
See id. at 308, 313-15, 319-20.
169.
See, e.g., Sidak, supra note 36, at 216.
170.
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015).
171.
Id. at 1030.
172.
Id.; Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993, 997 (W.D. Wash. 2012);
173.
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2015)
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differently, the duty of good faith and fair dealing was used as the
standard to find a breach of contract. 174 The district court noted that
there is no universal definition of the implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing, and it is up to the jury to decide whether the duty has been
breached.175

Although the common law and civil law systems have different
roots for the doctrine of good faith, the courts in both systems may view
the same actions as violations of the doctrine, as well as violations of
the FRAND obligation. In Microsoft, the district court's Judge Robart
instructed the jury that the breach of the good faith duty may arise from
either the patentee's excessive offers, its injunctive actions to enforce a
FRAND-encumbered patent, or these actions combined. 176 The Ninth
Circuit addressed SEP-holder Motorola's "overall course of conduct,"177
but focused more on the patent holder's infringement action and
injunctive relief against the standard implementer in determining the
breach of FRAND. 178 Nonetheless, some US courts have held that SEP
holders' seeking injunctive relief is a breach of contract without
invoking the duty of good faith and fair dealing.17 9 Scholars Kesan and
Hayes observed that the development of US case law suggests that
injunctions may not be an option for patent holders to enforce SEPs. 180
Similarly, in a civil law jurisdiction, the Tokyo District Court held that
FRAND-encumbered SEP holders' pursuit of a preliminary injunction
constituted an abuse of right and thus departed from the principle of
good faith. 18 1 The Huawei court, on the other hand, found IDC's
violation of FRAND based on its infringement litigation, pursuit of
injunctive relief against Huawei, and the excessive offer. 182 In
summary, although the good faith doctrine has different implications in
the common law and civil law traditions, SEP holders' seeking an
Verdict Form at 3, Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL
174.
5398081 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 4, 2013).
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C1O-1823JLR, 2013 WL 5373179, at *5 (W.D.
175.
Wash. Sept. 24, 2013).
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1045 (9th Cir. 2015).
176.
Id. at 1045.
177.
Id. at 1046.
178.
179.
Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
Kesan and Hayes, supranote 1, at 306.
180.
Cotter, supra note 3, at 325-26. It should also be noted that from a competition law
181.
perspective, SEP holders' seeking of injunction against implementers may be viewed as the abuse
of dominant position and cause the holdup problem. See, e.g., Dana Beldiman, Introduction:
Exclusion and Inclusion-The Role of IP Laws in a Shared Knowledge Environment, in
INNOVATION, COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION 1, 8 (Dana Beldiman ed., 2015); TINA HART ET
AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 291 (8th ed. 2015).

Youxian Gongsi Su Jiaohu Shuzi Tongxin Youxian Gongsi
[Huawei Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Communications, Inc. (Huawei
v. IDC)], 2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305 (Guangdong High People's Ct. 2013) (China).
182.
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injunction against standard implementers is widely recognized as a
violation of the FRAND obligation and the principle of good faith.
D. SAIC's Provisions
The State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) in
China recently issued the Provisions of the State Administration for
Industry and Commerce on Prohibiting the Abuse of Intellectual
Property
Rights
to
Preclude
or
Restrict
Competition
(flTId@Y~t,990t0k Bh'JWiifrit~P
("Provisions"). These were issued
on April 7, 2015, and came into effect on August 1 of the same year.1 83
The third paragraph of Article 13 of the Provisions defines a SEP as a
"patent which is essential to the implementation of such standard."1 8 4
More importantly, the second paragraph of the same Article may
become a legal basis for standard implementers to claim FRAND terms
against SEP holders in the future:
Businesses with dominant market position shall not, without justification, engage in the
acts below to exclude or restrict competition in the process of setting and implementing
standards:
..

2.

once the subject patent becomes a standard-essential patent, [the patent holder] will
violate the fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) principle, by
precluding or restricting competition, such as refusal to license, tying products, or

.

1.

imposing other unreasonable terms.

18 5

Although the violation of Article 13 constitutes an independent
ground for anti-monopoly liability,1 86 it has been made clear that SEP
holders bear the FRAND duty to standard implementers. Therefore, it
is possible that standard implementers will establish their FRAND
claims against SEP holders based on Article 13 of the Provisions.
183.
Provisions on Prohibiting the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Preclude or
Restrict Competition (promulgated by the St. Administration for Industry and Commerce, Apr. 7,
2015,
Aug.
1,
2015),
http://www.kangxin.com/en/index.php?optionid=927&auto-id=726
[https://perma.cc/JC2N-Y8XJ] (China).
Provisions, art. 13.
184.
Id.
185.
186.
Article 14 of the Provisions states: "Where an operator is suspected of abusing the
intellectual property rights to exclude or constraint competition, the administration for industry
and commerce shall perform the investigation in accordance with the Anti-monopoly Law and the
Provisions of the Administrations for Industry and Commerce on the Procedures for the
Investigation and Penalties of Monopoly Agreement Cases andAbuse of Dominant Market
Position Cases." Provisions, art. 14. Article 17(2) of the Provisions stipulates: "If an operator's
abuse of intellectual property rights to exclude or restrict competition constitutes an abuse of
dominant market position, the administration for industry and commerce shall order the operator
to stop the illegal act, confiscate the illegal income, and impose a fine of not less than 1% but not
more than 10% of annual sales of the previous year." Provisions, art. 17(2).
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Nevertheless, it should be noted that, because the Provisions are
designed according to Anti-Monopoly Law,18 7 they are primarily based
on antitrust and competition law concerns. Only businesses with
"dominant market position" will be charged with FRAND obligations.
This requirement does not exist for most of the scenarios in which SEP
holders bear FRAND duties.18 8 Moreover, the examples of FRAND
violations provided in the Provisions, such as refusal to deal or tying
arrangement, are also typical antitrust violations. It is uncertain
whether SEP holders' excessive pricing or initiating injunctive relief
will fall into the scope regulated by Article 13. In this respect, Article
13 might focus only on cases that implicate anti-monopoly law concerns.
On the other hand, Article 13 of the Provisionsmay occasionally
include cases beyond normal FRAND disputes, where both SEP holders
and standard implementers are affiliated with the same SSO and SEP
holders have made FRAND commitments to the organization
concerned.1 89 Although Article 13 does mention the standard setting
process, it does not require that SEP holders have previously made any
FRAND commitment, nor does it require that either the SEP holder or
the standard implementer should be a member of an SSO.190
Moreover, the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) and the
National Standardization Administration of China (SAC) recently
jointly released the (Provisional) Administration Regulations of
W)
National Standards Involving Patent
("ProvisionalRegulations"), which have been in effect since January 1,
2014.191 According to Article 10 of the ProvisionalRegulations, if the
patent holder refuses to license it under FRAND terms, the patent
cannot be included in non-mandatory national standards. 192 Article 15
further stipulates that if the compulsory national standard must
involve the patent whose owner refuses to license under FRAND terms,
the SAC, SIPO, and relevant authorities will negotiate a solution with
the holder. 193 However, the Provisional Regulations have limited
purview as the subject standards must involve Chinese national

187.
"In order to protect fair market competition, encourage innovation, and stop operators
from abusing intellectual property rights to exclude or restrict competition, the Provisions on the
Prohibition of the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Exclude or Restrict Competition
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Provisions') are formulated in accordance with the Anti-monopoly
Law of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the 'Anti-monopoly Law')."
Provisions, art. 1.
See supra notes 110-58 and accompanying text.
188.
189.
See supra note 110.
Provisions, art. 13.
190.
Provisions, art. 24.
191.
192.
Provisions, art. 10.
Provisions, art. 15.
193.
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standards. 194 Unlike the Provisionsmentioned in previous paragraphs,
the Provisional Regulations do not establish legal liability for FRAND
violations, but rather provide a signal of potential government
intervention into the FRAND negotiations associated with SEPs for
national standards.
Therefore, commentators suggest that the
ProvisionalRegulations "leave a number of definitional and procedural
ambiguities."1 9 5

E. SPC's Interpretation
On March 21, 2016, the Supreme People's Court (SPC) in China
issued the Interpretation(II) of the Supreme People's Court on Several
Issues concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Patent
Infringement
Dispute
Cases
("Interpretation"),which has been in effect since April 1, 2016.196 SPC's
judicial interpretations have been viewed as important normative
documents in the legal and economic development in China; 197
therefore, the above mentioned Interpretation may substantially
influence the judicial practice in patent litigation.
Article 24 of the Interpretationprovides SPC's view on FRAND.
Sections 1 and 3 of Article 24 stipulate the "negotiation before litigation
principle" in FRAND disputes. According to Section 1, SPC does not
support the defense raised by the alleged infringer that it does not need
to obtain a license from the SEP holder to practice the subject SEP. 198
Section 3 stipulates that licensing terms should be negotiated by SEP
holder and the alleged infringer, and parties may request the people's
courts determine the licensing terms if no consensus can be reached
from the negotiation. 199
Section 2 of Article 24 provides a defense for standard
implementers in patent litigation initiated by the SEP holder.
194.

Provisions, art. 2.

195.

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING, supra note

1, at 12.
196.
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Qinfan Zhuanliquan Jiufen Anjian Yingyong
Falv Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi II (A AW
(Z
[Interpretation (II) of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues concerning the Application of
Law in the Trial of Patent Infringement Dispute Cases], (issued by Sup. People's Ct., Mar. 31,
2016, effective. April. 1, 2016) (China), http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-18482.html
[https://perma.cc/FSG9-CDKF].
197.
See, e.g., Eric C. Ip, The Supreme People's Court and the PoliticalEconomy of Judicial
Empowerment in Contemporary China, 24 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 367, 403 (2011).
198.
Interpretation (II) of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues concerning the
Application of Law in the Trial of Patent Infringement Dispute Cases, art. 24, § 1.
199.
Interpretation (II) of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues concerning the
Application of Law in the Trial of Patent Infringement Dispute Cases, art. 24, § 3.
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According to Section 2, the SEP holder's request to prevent the
implementer from practicing the subject SEP is not validated if (1)
parties fail to reach a license agreement because the SEP holder
violates its FRAND obligation during the preparation of the standard
and its negotiation with the implementer, and (2) the implementer does
not commit any obvious fault. 200 This Section provides standard
implementers significant advantage over SEP holders' claims for
infringement. The latter will not be able to use an injunction or
litigation to force the former to accept licensing terms that are against
the FRAND commitment during the negotiation. 201 However, Section 2
is not a direct legal basis for standard implementers to enforce SEP
holders' FRAND obligations. It is, at most, a defense, rather than a
legal right, that standard implementers can raise against SEP holders'
injunction or infringement claims. Nonetheless, it is not yet clear if
SPC aimed to define FRAND commitment as a "covenant not to sue" or
an action with other legal effect in this Interpretation.202 It is
worthwhile to observe how Chinese courts implement Section 2 of
Article 24 in the Interpretationin the future.
V. JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF THE FRAND RATE

In Huawei, IDC argued that the court should not intervene in
the licensing negotiations between private parties. 203
However,
Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court countered by pointing out that
IDC had a double standard for judicial intervention: on the one hand, it
resorted to court for injunctions in the United States and yet sought to
prevent Huawei from seeking judicial remedy on the other. 204 Based on
the decision of Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court, the Guangdong
High Court further stated that although it was not a compulsory
licensing (CL) case, IDC could not refuse to license to Huawei because
of its FRAND commitment. 205 The court held that there were some
similarities between CL and FRAND scenarios in terms of royalty rate

Interpretation (II) of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues concerning the
200.
Application of Law in the Trial of Patent Infringement Dispute Cases, art. 24, § 2.
Id.
201.
See, e.g., Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND's Forever, supranote 1, at 289 ("[When a
202.
patent owner makes a FRAND commitment, we argue that this acts as a
conditional covenant not to sue, whereby the patent owner promises to not sue standard
implementers for infringement unless and until good faith attempts at negotiation fail.").
Huawei Jishu Youxian Gongsi Su Jiaohu Shuzi Tongxin Youxian Gongsi ($ tA;
203.
[Huawei Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Communications, Inc. (Huawei
R)
v. IDC)], 2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305 (Guangdong High People's Ct. 2013) (China).
204.
Id.
205.
Id.
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determination. 20 6 In both situations, the court would decide the royalty
rate if the negotiation between a patentee and a potential licensee
breaks down. 207 One can certainly understand that Chinese patent law
presumes that the court is capable of determining the royalty rate from
the CL provision in Chinese patent law, which stipulates that the court
needs to decide the CL royalty for a patentee and a potential licensee. 208
Therefore, by referring to Articles 57 and .58 of the Chinese Patent
Law, 209 the Huawei court ruled that parties can resort to the courts if
no agreement has been reached on royalty. 210 From a comparative
perspective, the law or judicial practices of some European civil law
countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, also link FRAND
obligations with CL to a certain degree. 211 Although the US practice
clearly distinguishes the treatment of FRAND obligations and CL, 2 1 2 a
line of theories has argued that the content and procedural
implementation of CL and FRAND are fairly similar. 213 Indeed, the
existence of CL in patent law presumes the court's capability of
determining the FRAND rate. Nonetheless, commentators have long
suggested that courts are ill-suited to interpret the reasonable and
market values of IP licenses. 214
Whether the court should intervene in the FRAND
determination after the failed negotiations and whether it is capable of
computing an appropriate rate may be two different matters. The
206.
Id.
207.
Id.
208.
Patent Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat'1
People's
Cong.,
Dec.
27,
2008),
art.
58,
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/1exdocs/laws/en/cn/cn028en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8YDX-KUHY]
(China).
209.
According to Article 57 of the Chinese Patent Law, the patent administration
department under the State Council can decide the compulsory licensing rate if two parties cannot
reach an agreement. Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, art 57.
210.
2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305.
211.
Sternberg, supra note 8, at 237; see also Nuno Pires de Carvalho, Technical
Standards, Intellectual Property, and Competition-A Holistic View, 47 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 61,
82 (2015) (documenting that in a number of jurisdictions, courts may apply compulsory licensing
provisions to ensure interoperability when the implementer's technology is technically and
economically significant).
212.
See, e.g., Contreras, A BriefHistory of FRAND, supra note 42, at 45; Sternberg, supra
note 8, at 239.
213.
See, e.g., Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND, supra note 42, at 45.
214.
See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1308 (1996); see also Christoph
Rademacher, Injunctive Relief in PatentCases in the US, Germany and Japan:Recent Development
and Outlook, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW 325, 340

(Toshiko

Takenaka ed., 2013) (noting that the German Federal Supreme Court ruled that courts do not
have a position to evaluate a reasonable royalty rate). But see Christine Graham & Jeremy Morton,
Latest EU Developments in Standards, Patents, and FRAND Licensing, 36 EURO. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 700, 705 ("Undoubtedly, the courts are capable of assessing a FRAND rate.").
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Huawei court opined that it should intervene because IDC had once
resorted to the judicial system against Huawei as well. 2 15 The Huawei
court ruled that it was competent to determine the FRAND rate based
on an analogy with the CL provision in Patent Law. 2 16 Comparatively,
some US courts also faced the question regarding their roles in FRAND
determination. In Apple, Judge Crabbe decided not to determine a
reasonable rate because "it would not be in the public interest for the
court to spend such enormous resources to determine a FRAND rate
that may ultimately lead to additional litigation." 2 17 This decision
concerned the limited judicial resources, rather than the court's ability
to determine the FRAND rate. By contrast, in Microsoft v. Motorola,
the judge held that:
Having made the determination that Motorola must grant a [F]RAND license for its
essential patents, the court is left with the inescapable conclusion that a forum must exist
to resolve honest disputes . . . as to what in fact constitutes a [F]RAND license agreement.
Here the courthouse may be the only such forum.

2 18

The Huawei court's approach to the judicial role in the
determination of the FRAND rate is similar to that of Microsoft, which
is that the court should undertake the complex task of determining the
FRAND royalty rate. This Part will analyze how the Huawei court
decided the FRAND rate from a critical perspective. This Part will also
identify the flaws and inadequacies in Huawei from the perspective of
an appropriate basis for royalty computation 2 19 and the timing of the
hypothetical negotiation. 220
A. Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory
The Huawei court made it clear that the goal of FRAND is to
assure that patentees can obtain sufficient compensation for their
technological innovation, while ensuring that they cannot exploit the
favorable position given them by the standard by charging an overly
high royalty rate or imposing unreasonable conditions. 221 In other
words, from a policy perspective, FRAND aims to look after the
incentive provided by the patent system and, in the meantime, avoid
2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305.
215.
Id.
216.
Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11-CV-178-BBC, 2012 WL 5416931, at *3
217.
(W.D. Wis. Nov. 2, 2012).
218.
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2012 WL 4827743, at *6 (W.D.
Wash. Oct. 10, 2012).
See infra parts IV.A and IV.B.
219.
220.
See infra part IV.C.
221.
Huawei Jishu Youxian Gongsi Su Jiaohu Shuzi Tongxin Youxian Gongsi
Ei@ [Huawei Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Communications, Inc. (Huawei
iMg@
g
(1f
v. IDC)], 2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305 (Guangdong High People's Ct. 2013) (China).
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the hold-up problem. Both first- and second-instance courts in the
Huawei case ruled that IDC violated its FRAND obligation. 222 A
lengthy part of both decisions analyzed whether IDC's royalty offers to
Huawei were reasonable and non-discriminatory. Such analysis is
closely related to the determination of the FRAND rate.
Huawei also illustrates that once the court points out the SEP
holder's violation of the FRAND obligation, it may use the same criteria
to calculate the FRAND rate. To put it differently, the court may
determine the FRAND rate based on the factors that it used to find the
unfairness, unreasonableness, and discrimination from the SEP
holder's previous royalty offers.
1. Reasonable Rate
a. Factorsto Be Considered for Determininga Reasonable Rate
A "reasonable royalty" is at the heart of FRAND commitment. 223
However, the term "fair and reasonable" is too ambiguous to be
constrained by only one interpretation. 2 2 4 Scholars have pointed out
that the reasonable royalty of FRAND-encumbered patents can be
obtained from a hypothetical voluntary transaction or negotiation. 225
The Guangdong High Court affirmed the Shenzhen Intermediate
People's Court's ruling that the FRAND rate, in this case, should not
exceed 0.019 percent of the actual sales prices of Huawei's wireless
devices. 226 In determining this "reasonable" rate and evaluating IDC's
previous offers to Huawei, the court took into consideration the factors
below: 227
(1) The profits generated by employing the subject SEPs or
similar patents, and the proportion of such profits in the
licensee's overall profits and revenue 228

222.
Id.
223.
See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, Setting Reasonable Royalties, supra note 7, at 1146; see
also Tsai & Wright, supra note 48, at 161 (noting that the deficiencies of SSOs' IPR policies include
"contractual ambiguity, such as the adoption of terms subject to ex post interpretation").
224.
See, e.g., Geradin, The Meaning of "Fairand Reasonable", supra note 6, at 939-40;
see also Keele, supra note 35, at 191 ("[T]he [F]RAND commitments . . . have remained
intentionally vague . . . .").
225.
See, e.g., Allensworth, supra note 42, at 245; Geradin, The Meaning of "Fairand
Reasonable", supra note 6, at 939; Keele, supra note 35, at 223; Lemley & Shapiro, Setting
Reasonable Royalties, supra note 7, at 1147; Ragavan et al., supranote 26, at 91.
226.
2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305.
227.
Id.
228.
Id.
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(2) Whether the patentee can profit only from its patent, not the
standard 229;
(3) The number of valid patents in the standard held by the
patentee 230; and
(4) Whether the royalty should account for part of, not all, the
licensee's profits from the product because SEPs contribute
only part of the product's value. 2 31
The first factor looks into the profits of the implementer and the
proportion of profits contributed by SEPs. Likewise, in Microsoft v.
Motorola,232 Judge Robart pointed out that the FRAND rate should be
set by "looking at the importance of . . . the SEPs to the products at
issue." 233 Such analysis is also similar to Judge Holderman's approach,
suggested by Dr. Gregory Leonard, in In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC
Patent Litigation,234 where no previous benchmark license was
available. 235 By proposing the "top down" methodology, 236 Dr. Leonard
intended to ensure that "the total royalty stack will not exceed an
amount that would force [implementers] out of business." 237
Nevertheless, the main difference between Huawei and Innovatio is
that the Innovatio court used the real numbers of SEPs, profits, and
average sale prices to calculate the FRAND rate. 238 By contrast, the
Huawei court stated that it took into consideration Huawei's profits and
the proportion contributed by IDC's SEPs, but the court did not conduct
any calculation with numbers associated with Huawei's profits and
sales price. 239 It is, therefore, quite difficult to understand how the first
factor influenced the court's determination of the FRAND rate.
229.
Id.
The court explained further that it is, therefore, unreasonable for the SEPs holder to
230.
charge the implementer a royalty for non-SEPs. See 2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305.
231.
Id.
232.
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217 (W.D. Wash.
Apr. 25, 2013).
233.
Id. at *3.
234.
In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at
*38 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013).
Id. at *31, *38.
235.
See, e.g., Maldonado, supra note 3, at 454.
236.
In re Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *38.
237.
238.
Guangliang Zhang & Gary Zhang, A Review of Huawei v IDC, MANAGING INTELL.
PROP. (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.managingip.com/Article/3440420/A-review-of-Huawei-vIDC.html [https://perma.cc/9CK6-FP4Q].
Huawei Jishu Youxian Gongsi Su Jiaohu Shuzi Tongxin Youxian Gongsi
239.
[Huawei Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Communications, Inc. (Huawei
(]
v. IDC)], 2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305 (Guangdong High People's Ct. 2013) (China).
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Huawei's insufficient elucidation may demonstrate the degree of
sophistication required to apportion the value of specific SEPs from the
whole product involving numerous technologies. This sophisticated
calculation may fall beyond the Huawei court's ability.
The Huawei court made it clear that SEP holders can only collect
royalties associated with the technological contribution, rather than the
fact that such patents are SEPs. 24 0 It is noteworthy that the second
factor-"patentee can only profit from its patent, not the standard"-is
consistent with some economists' suggestion that "[lreasonable should
mean the royalties that the patent holder could obtain in open, up-front
competition with other technologies, not the royalties that the patent
holder can extract once other participants are effectively locked in to
use technology covered by the patent." 2 4 1 Judge Robart in Microsoft
likewise noted that "[firom an economic perspective, a [F]RAND
commitment should be interpreted to limit a patent holder to a
reasonable royalty on the economic value of its patented technology
itself, apart from the value associated with incorporation of the
patented technology into the standard." 2 42 In other words, SEP holders
should not exploit the subject standard and the accompanying lock-in
effect to charge a higher royalty rate; otherwise, the hold-up problem
will come into existence in the standard implementation process. 2 4 3
The third factor-"the number of valid patents in the standard
held by the patentee"-emphasizes the role of SEPs in the overall
standard. 24 4 This consideration can also be found in some academic
discussions. 2 4 5 By the same token, in the Microsoft case, the district
court looked into "the objective value each [SEP] contributed to each
standard." 246 In determining such "objective value," the Microsoft court
considered "the quality of the technology and the alternatives as well
as the importance of those technologies to Microsoft's business." 24 7 The
idea of "the importance of those technologies to Microsoft business" 248 is
close to the first and the fourth factors listed by the Huawei court, which

240.

Id.

241.

CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE

NETWORK ECONOMY 241 (1999).
242.
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C1O-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *12 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 25, 2013)
243.
Id. at *12, *19; see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
244.
2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305.
245.
See, e.g., Anne Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 44, at 675-79 (2007); Sternberg, supra
note 8, at 245.
246.
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1040 (9th Cir. 2015).
247.
Id.
248.
Id.
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underline SEPs' contributions to the standard implementer's business
or products.
The fourth factor puts a limit on the royalty rate based on the
profits that an implementer can reasonably extract from the product
and the contribution of the subject SEPs. Economists have similarly
suggested that the incremental value in hypothetical negotiations
should "be less than the full profits of the licensee." 249 This factor echoes
the idea of "incremental value," which refers to the value contributed
by the SEP in a product. 250 In Microsoft,251 Judge Robart also carefully
considered the implementer's ability to pay the royalty fee from selling
the product. 252 Such considerations recall the royalty stacking theory,
contending that, in order to avoid royalty stacking, SEPs should not be
awarded more than a certain percentage of the price of implementers'
products; otherwise, the price would be unreasonable. 2 5 3 In other
words, when multiple SEP holders claim for royalties against the same
implementer, the total of the royalties should not exceed the profits
earned by the implementer from the subject product. 254 However, in
order to prevent royalty stacking, Judge Robart established the upper
bound of the FRAND rate by calculating a pro rata share of Motorola's
SEP portfolio. 255 By contrast, the Huawei court did not conduct any
similar detailed calculations. 2 5 6 Without such a calculation, the
FRAND rate that Huawei reached may be criticized as a speculation.
Most of the factors listed by the Huawei court are general and
This may result from the difficulty in
not explained in detail.
257 a difficulty that Huawei did not
of
SEPs,
measuring the value
mention at all. 2 5 8 Beyond these factors, the court ruled that IDC's offer
to tie its SEP with non-SEP patents was neither fair nor reasonable. 259
249.
Carlton & Shampine, Economic Interpretationof FRAND, supra note 3, at 536.
250.
Contreras & Gilbert, A Unified Frameworkfor FRAND, supra note 3, at 1467-68.
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217 (W.D. Wash.
251.
Apr. 25, 2013).
Id. at *260-61.
252.
253.
See, e.g., Damien Geradin & Miguel Rato, FRAND Commitments and EC Competition
Law: A Reply to Philippe Chappatte, 6 EUR. COMPETITION J. 129, 138 (2010); Lemley & Shapiro,
supra note 42, at 2011. But see Geradin, The Meaning of "Fairand Reasonable", supra note 6, at
943-44 (criticizing the assumptions and applications of the royalty stacking theory).
254.
See, e.g., Contreras & Gilbert, A Unified Framework for FRAND, supra note 3, at
1483.
Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *87.
255.
Huawei Jishu Youxian Gongsi Su Jiaohu Shuzi Tongxin Youxian Gongsi
256.
R211 [Huawei Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Communications, Inc. (Huawei
(WJ9M04920% Mfl ffiT0
v. IDC)], 2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305 (Guangdong High People's Ct. 2013) (China).
Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *13 (indicating the difficulty of deciding the
257.
incremental value of patents).
Id.
258.
2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305.
259.
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In exchange for the license of its SEP, IDC asked Huawei and its
affiliated companies to grant a global royalty-free cross-license of all its
patents. 260 The court looked into factors such as the number of R&D
employees and patents both companies have, and concluded that
Huawei's patent portfolio is more valuable regarding quantity and
quality, and the global royalty-free cross-license requested by IDC was,
thus, obviously unfair and unreasonable. 2 61
b. Cross Licensing and NPEs
Nevertheless, cross licensing is a common practice in the context
of SEPs and the high technology industry generally. 262 Whether a cross
license is fair and reasonable cannot be determined purely by the
comparison of R&D employees and patent portfolios. Cross-licensing
may sometimes help reduce the royalty rate of SEPs. Therefore, the
practice of cross licensing can, to some extent, prevent royalty stacking.
and the accompanying costs borne by implementers. 263 However,without conscientious evaluation of both parties' patent portfolios, the
Huawei court reached the conclusion that IDC's cross-licensing and
royalty proposal was neither fair nor reasonable. 264 This insufficient
analysis is probably because the court was of the opinion that the
royalty rate requested by IDC was already excessively high,
irrespective of a cross license. Therefore, it was obvious that a global
royalty-free cross license from Huawei could not help mitigate the
royalty stacking problem at all.
Huawei also provides an interesting lens to understand the role
of NPEs-entities that make profit from asserting patents without
making and selling productS 265-in SEP disputes.
Conventional
wisdom suggests that NPEs would not seek cross licensing in
infringement disputes as they do not produce products and, thus, do not
need cross licenses from their adversaries. 266 This line of argument
260.
Id.
261.
Id.
262.
See, e.g., Geradin, The Meaning of "Fairand Reasonable", supra note 6, at 943;
Maldonado, supra note 3, at 428.
263.
See, e.g., Geradin, The Meaning of "Fairand Reasonable", supra note 6, at 943-44.
But see Maldonado, supra note 3, at 420 ("[C]ross-licensing has done little to stem the tide of
litigation.").
264.
2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305.
265.
See supranote 70 and accompanying text.
266.
See, e.g., Allison et al., supra note 70, at 1129-30; Tracie L. Bryant, Note, The America
Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 673, 691 (2012); Colleen V.
Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 31 (2014); Cotropia
et al., supra note 70, at 650; James Farrand et al., "Reform" Arrives in Patent Enforcement: The
Big Picture, 51 IDEA 357, 441 (2011); Lim, Standard Essential Patent, at 19; Ian Polonsky, You
Can't Go Home Again: The Righthaven Cases and Copyright Trolling on the Internet, 36 COLUM.
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suggests that NPEs are interested only in monetary payment. 267
However, as an NPE, IDC did seek a free global cross license from
Huawei. 268 In the court proceedings, IDC argued that a cross license
would not create any value for the company because it did not produce
or sell any product. 269 Thus, its pursuit of a cross license from Huawei
would not violate the FRAND commitment. 270 It was not clear why IDC
was interested in obtaining cross-licensing from Huawei. The court
ruled that a free license from Huawei would significantly increase IDC's
market value, and it was possible that IDC would exploit the crosslicensed patents to produce products in the future. 271 However, the
court neither explained how and to what extent a free cross license
would significantly increase an NPE's market value, nor provided any
evidence supporting such an opinion.
2. Non-Discriminatory Rate
In the context of standard-setting, "non-discriminatory" means
that all similarly situated implementers should pay the same royalty
As royalties constitute an
rate for SEP-encumbered patents. 272
essential part of product costs, 2 7 3 standard implementers are naturally
not willing to pay a higher rate than their competitors do; otherwise,
they will have insurmountable difficulties competing with other players
on price. In this sense, a non-discriminatory rate ensures standard
implementers, especially newcomers, a level playing field in the
industry. 274 The SEP royalty's nature as costs for implementers'
market entry explains why standard implementers typically show great
the
With
rate.
non-discriminatory
about
the
concern
non-discriminatory requirement, newcomers are able to benefit from a

J.L. & ARTs 71, 73 n.13 (2012); Soroudi, supra note 70, at 323-24; Sinan Utku, The Near Certainty
of PatentAssertion Entity Victory in Portfolio Patent Litigation, 19 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 18 (2004);
Allen W. Wang, Note, Rise of the Patent Intermediaries,25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 159, 172 (2010).
See, e.g., Allison et al., supra note 70, at 1129-30; David L. Schwartz, On Mass Patent
267.
Aggregators, 114 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 51, 53 (2014).
268.
2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305.
Id.
269.
Id.
270.
Id.
271.
272.
See, e.g., Allensworth, supra note 42, at 243; Carlton & Shampine, Economic
Interpretationof FRAND, supranote 3, at 546; Joseph Scott Miller, StandardSetting, Patents, and
Access-in: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 351, 355 (2007); Sternberg,
supra note 8, at 233.
See, e.g., David J. Teece & Edward F. Sherry, Standards Setting and Antitrust, 87
273.
MINN. L. REV. 1913, 1956 n.149 (2003).
See, e.g., John Temple Lang, Eight Important Questions on Standards Under
274.
European Competition Law, 7(1) COMPETITION L. INT'L 32, 32 (2011); Ragavan et al., supra note
26, at 92.
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license ex ante negotiated by their competitors and SEP holders.
Consequently, newcomers or other standard implementers do not need
to worry that SEP holders will charge them a higher rate than their
competitors.
As economists suggest, the non-discriminatory
requirement can avoid SEP holders' strategic behavior and mitigate
corresponding inefficiencies. 2 7 5
Scholars have been debating whether there is a mathematical
formula to calculate the FRAND rate. 2 7 6 In determining a nondiscriminatory rate, the Huawei court held that the SEP holders should
charge the standard implementers the same royalty rate in other
transactions with the same fundamental conditions. 277 The US court in
Apple held a similar opinion that "only ... licenses should be considered
when comparable." 278 The royalty rate under other licenses for the
same patent is occasionally an important factor to determine the
"reasonableness," as well. 2 79 Nonetheless, as there is always a wide
range of factors in different licensing transactions, 28 0 it is obviously not
easy to define what is a transaction "with the same fundamental
conditions," or a "comparable" license.
Furthermore, licensing
arrangements are occasionally relationship specific. 28 1 Company X's
licensing agreement with Company Y is not necessarily the same as its
transaction with Company Z over the same patents.
The Huawei courts opined that IDC had violated the FRAND
obligation because it charged Huawei unreasonably high licensing
rates, which were excessively higher than those paid by Apple and
Samsung. 282 Such an approach seems plausible as SEP holders' deals
with other implementers sometimes become evidence of a reasonable
price and because SEP holders should not discriminate against
different implementers. 283 In the United States, patentees' previous
agreements with other parties have been used to determine damages

275.
See, e.g., Carlton & Shampine, supra note 3, at 546-47; Richard J. Gilbert, Deal or No
Deal? Licensing Negotiations in Standard-Setting Organizations, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 855, 868-70
(2011).
276.
See, e.g., Geradin, The Meaning of "Fairand Reasonable", supra note 6, at 938, 949.
277.
Huawei Jishu Youxian Gongsi Su Jiaohu Shuzi Tongxin Youxian Gongsi
(
Huawei Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Communications, Inc. (Huawei
v. IDC)], 2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305 (Guangdong High People's Ct. 2013) (China).
278.
Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. 757 F.3d 1286, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
279.
See, e.g., Geradin, The Meaning of "Fairand Reasonable", supra note 6, at 949-50.
280.
See, e.g., Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND, supra note 42, at 78; Geradin, The
Meaning of "Fairand Reasonable", supra note 6, at 928.
281.
Geradin, The Meaning of "Fairand Reasonable", supra note 6, at 951-52; see also
Contreras, Fixing FRAND, supra note 2, at 70 ("[T]he determination of 'reasonable' rates can be
highly context-specific, as well as party-specific and patent-specific.")
282.
2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305.
283.
Lemley & Shapiro, Setting Reasonable Royalties, supranote 7, at 1149.
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284
In
for patent infringement in hypothetical royalty agreements.
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., the Southern District of
New York set out fifteen factors to consider in deciding a reasonable
royalty rate the parties might have agreed upon in a hypothetical
negotiation. 285 Such a framework has been widely adopted by district
and Federal Circuit courts in the United States to calculate patent
damages. 286 In recent years, some US courts have adopted a number of

Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
284.
Id. These fifteen factors are:
285.
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit, proving or tending
to prove an established royalty.
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the patent in suit.
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as restricted or nonrestricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the manufactured product may be sold.

4. The licensor's established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent monopoly by
not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses under special conditions designed
to preserve that monopoly.
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as, whether they are
competitors in the same territory in the same line of business; or whether they are inventor and
promoter.
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products of the licensee;
that existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of his non-patented items;
and the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales.
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its commercial success; and
its current popularity.
9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices, if any, that had
been used for working out similar results.

10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial embodiment of it as
owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those who have used the invention.
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any evidence probative
of the value of that use.
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the particular business
or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the invention or analogous inventions.
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished
from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or
improvements added by the infringer.
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the infringer) would
have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily
trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent licensee- who desired, as a
business proposition, to obtain a license to.manufacture and sell a particular article embodying
the patented invention- would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a
reasonable profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was
willing to grant a license.
See, e.g., LaserDynamics, Inc. v. QuantaComputer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 60 n.2 (Fed. Cir.
286.
2012); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Panduit Corp.
v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1157-58 (6th Cir. 1978); Contreras & Gilbert, A
Unified Framework for RAND, supra note 3, at 1481.
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Georgia-Pacific factors to determine the FRAND royalty rate, 287
including the royalties a patent holder received in other licensing
agreements. 288
The primary advantage of the Georgia-Pacific
framework is that it takes multiple factors into consideration in a
flexible way, which appropriately fits FRAND's goal of balancing the
interests of SEP holders and standard implementers. 289 Therefore, it is
not surprising that the internal discussion of ETSI also recognized that
the Georgia-Pacific test "closely parallels the concept of [FRAND]
license obligations."2 9 0
The Huawei court likewise used the royalties that IDC received
from its transactions with Apple and Samsung to determine the
FRAND rate. 291 IDC offered Apple a seven-year (from 2007 to 2014),
non-exclusive, and non-transferrable global license for $56 million. 292
Based on the public information disclosed by Apple and from other
sources, the revenue associated with iPhone in the same period was at
least $300 billion. 293 Therefore, the court estimated that Apple's royalty
to IDC was about 0.0187 percent of Apple's iPhone sales revenue. 294 On
the other hand, IDC had a three-year (from 2009 to 2012) non-exclusive,
non-transferrable global license agreement with Samsung for $400
million. 295 Based on the public information disclosed by Samsung and
from other sources, the court estimated that Samsung's revenue
associated with smartphone sales from 2007 to 2012 was $210 billion.
Therefore, the court further calculated that Samsung's royalty rate paid
to IDC was about 0.19 percent of Samsung's smartphone sales
revenue.296

The rates estimated by the court regarding IDC's transactions
with Apple and Samsung are quite different (0.0187% as opposed to

287.
See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1041 (9th Cir, 2015);
Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re Innovatio IP
Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013);
Contreras, Fixing FRAND, supra note 2, at 71; see also Contreras & Gilbert, A Unified Framework
for RAND, supra note 3, at 1459 ("[R]ecent federal court opinions have modified the Georgia-Pacific
factors to accommodate perceived unique characteristics of [F]RAND commitments."); Anne
Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 44, at 673-81.
288.
Microsoft, 795 F.3d at 1043.
289.
Geradin, The Meaning of "Fairand Reasonable", supra note 6, at 948-49.
290.
See id., at 948 n.120.
291.
Huawei Jishu Youxian Gongsi Su Jiaohu Shuzi Tongxin Youxian Gongsi
($##A4WW, irg881
W2111. [Huawei Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Communications, Inc. (Huawei
v. IDC)], 2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305 (Guangdong High People's Ct. 2013) (China).
292.
See id.
293.
See id.
294.
See id.
295.
See id.
296.
See id.

78

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. XIX:1:37

0.19%, respectively). 297 The court contended that Apple's rate should
be closer to a FRAND rate as IDC licensed those SEPs to Apple in 2007,
and the court believed that the deal was made on a fair, equal, and
voluntary basis. 298 By contrast, Samsung and IDC entered into the
license agreement against the backdrop of litigation between both
The court, therefore, implied that the IDC/Samsung
parties. 299
transaction was not an ideal reference for determining the FRAND
rate.300
The Huawei court is not the only one that considered litigation
as an important factor to determine FRAND rates. From a comparative
perspective, the US courts in Microsoft had similar considerations in
determining the FRAND rate at issue there.3 01 Both the Ninth Circuit
and the district court found that Motorola's licenses with VTech
Communications, RIM, and Symbol were not trustworthy indicators for
the FRAND rate because the deals were all entered into to resolve
ongoing infringement disputes or litigation. 302 Likewise, in In re
Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation,303 Judge Holderman held
that if a license was part of a settlement made under the duress of
litigation, such a license was not a comparable license to determine the
FRAND rate. 304 Therefore, whether a previous license was made as a
result of infringement litigation or settlement is an important factor to
choose a comparable benchmark for FRAND determination.
The main criticism of the Huawei decisions is that the courts did
not develop detailed reasoning for the estimated FRAND rate of 0.019
percent of the actual sales prices of Huawei's wireless devices,
especially compared to similar cases decided by the US courts.3 05 Some
commentators believe that the FRAND rate of 0.019 percent is actually

297.
See id.
298.
See id.
299.
See id.
300.
See id.
See id.
301.
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2015).
302.
In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at
303.
*38 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013).
Id. Some patent law scholars hold a similar view, as well. See, e.g., Lim, Standard
304.
EssentialPatent, supra note 1, at 39-40 ("Licenses resulting from settlement agreements should
be disregarded because their reliability is compromised by the fact that royalty figure might be
higher than if it were determined by the court."); see also John M. Goden, Principlesfor Patent
Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 508 (2010) (finding that, historically, a patent holder might leverage
to obtain a settlement for a higher royalty).
Zhou Zhaofeng, Huawei Uses AML to Fight Back, CHINA L. & PRAC. (Jan. 16, 2014),
305.
http://www.chinalawandpractice.comsites/clp/2014/01/16/huawei-uses-aml-to-fight-back/
[https://perma.cclV4NQ-GUXF].
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much lower than the comparable royalty rate in the global market. 306
Some even suspect that this rate was set low enough to meet the
industrial policy that aimed to promote Huawei's competitiveness in the
global telecommunications industry. 307
Although we have no evidence regarding such industrial
concerns in the court decision, it is fair to say that the Huawei courts
have attempted to meet the international standards to a certain degree.
The reasoning in Huawei is far from sufficient and satisfactory.
Nonetheless, it did identify some of the crucial issues underlying
FRAND and SEPs.
As Judge Holderman carefully observed in
Innovatio, "no approach for calculating a [F]RAND rate is [perfect] in
light of the inherent uncertainty in calculating a reasonable royalty"
because "the court must reconstruct a hypothetical negotiation under a
variety of assumptions and inferences about the influence of the
[F]RAND obligation on hypothetical parties negotiating at a
hypothetical time under hypothetical circumstances." 3 0 8 In the next two
sections, this Article will analyze Huawei's approach in rate calculation'
base and the timing of the hypothetical negotiation.
B. Methods of Royalties Calculation
The Huawei court rightfully pointed out that SEP holders have
different options for calculating the royalty rate. 309 However, it did not
explain in detail the differences between the royalty calculation
approaches of the IDC/Apple transaction and the hypothetical
negotiation in this case, nor how the differences matter for the
determination of a FRAND rate. One of the important references for
the Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court and the Guangdong High
Court to decide 0.019 percent as the FRAND rate was the royalty that
IDC charged Apple in a seven-year non-exclusive license agreement. 310
According to the courts' calculations, IDC charged Apple 0.018 percent
of its revenue as a licensing fee, which, compared to Samsung's rate of
0.19 percent of revenue, is fairer and based on voluntary negotiation. 311
By contrast, the IDC/Samsung license was made against the backdrop

306.
An Unexpected Turn for IPRs in China, ECONOMIST (Nov. 26, 2014),
http://www.eiu.com/industry/article/1992525183/an-unexpected-turn-for-iprs-in-china/2014-11-27
[https://perma.cc/Q5WQ-DCSW].
307.
Sokol & Zheng, FRAND in China, supra note 12, at 91.
In re Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at 37.
308.
309.
Huawei Jishu Youxian Gongsi Su Jiaohu Shuzi Tongxin Youxian Gongsi
(f
iji
1w [Huawei Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Communications, Inc. (Huawei
v. IDC)], 2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305 (Guangdong High People's Ct. 2013) (China).
310.
See id.
311.
See id.
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of infringement litigation. 312 Therefore, the FRAND rate, in this case,
should be close to Apple's rate of 0.0187 percent. 313
Nonetheless, the Huawei courts failed to capture other facts and
background of the transaction between Apple and IDC. When IDC and
Apple signed the license agreement in 2007, Apple had not yet released
the first generation iPhone, not to mention that most people did not
expect that Apple would become the toughest player in the smartphone
market. 314 Therefore, IDC, like most other players in the market, could
hardly imagine that Apple's iPhone would become a huge business
success that brought in about $300 billion in sales revenue in seven
years. There are a variety of ways to determine a royalty structure in
a patent licensing transaction. It can be a fixed fee; a certain percentage
of the licensee's revenue, sales, net profits, or gross profits from
products reading on the subject patent; or a royalty on the number of
products produced by the licensee. 315 Different industries may have
different practices and formats for royalty payment, which are all
pricing decisions made by the parties. 316 Sometimes the parties may
use a mixed approach to calculating the license fee. For example, in
order to obtain a license to Motorola's SEPs for mobile devices, RIM
"provided Motorola a license to its own SEPs, paid Motorola a large
lump sum, and agreed to pay as a royalty rate a percentage of the net
sales price of any mobile device it sold, subject to an annual royalty
cap."

3 17

According to the agreement between IDC and Apple, the royalty
was a fixed amount of $56 million set beforehand, rather than 0.0187
percent of Apple's iPhone revenue.3 1 8 The number 0.0187 percent was
See id.
312.
See id.
313.
314.
Apple iPhone was indeed unblessed in the market back to 2007. See, e.g., John
Dvorak, Apple Should Pull the Plug on the iPhone, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 28, 2007),
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/apple-should-pull-the-plug-on-the-iphone
[https://perma.cc/9A4P-K859]; Tammy Parker, Apple's iPhone: Were Predictionsof Failure Wrong
or

Just

Premature?,

FIERCEWIRELESSWORK

(June

28,

2012),

http://www.fiercewireless.com/tech/story/apples-iphone-were-predictions-failure-wrong-or-justpremature/2012-06-28 [https://perma.cc/LV2L-U4ZU]; Martin J. Wagner, The Unexpected Success
of the 2007 Apple iPhone, ALLEGIENT (Feb. 20, 2015), http://blog.allegient.com/the-unexpectedsuccess-of-the-2007-apple-iphone [https://perma.cclUL45-NDDF].
315.
See, e.g., Encino Bus. Mgmt., Inc. v. Prize Frize, Inc. (In re Prize Frize, Inc.), 32 F.3d
426, 427-29 (9th Cir. 1994); ROBERT W. GOMULKIEWICZ ET AL., LICENSING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: LAW AND APPLICATION 68 (2008); RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND OTHER INFORMATION ASSETS 523-25 (2004); KENNETH L. PORT ET AL., LICENSING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 294-96 (2nd ed. 2005).

See, e.g., NIMMER, supra note 315, at 523-24.
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2015).
Huawei Jishu Youxian Gongsi Su Jiaohu Shuzi Tongxin Youxian Gongsi
[Huawei Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Communications, Inc. (Huawei
(
v. IDC)], 2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305 (Guangdong High People's Ct. 2013) (China).
316.
317.
318.
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the court's hindsight, not the exact term written in the agreement. 3 19
IDC therefore argued in this case that the success of Apple iPhone is a
commercial exception, 320 implying that the company should have
charged Apple a much higher licensing fee or adopted a different royalty
structure if it could have predicted iPhone's exceptional attainment. In
this sense, the royalty set in the IDC/Apple licensing agreement may
not be completely reasonable in hindsight.
Table 2: IDC's Licenses with Apple and Samsung

Time
Term

Apple

Samsung

2007-2014

2007~2012321

Non-exclusive, non-transferrable, global license

Royalty Amount

USD $56 Million

USD $400 Million

Licensee's Revenue from Mobile

USD $300 Billion

USD $209.751 Billion322

0.0187%

0.19%

Products

Royalty Rate

A fixed amount and a certain percentage of a licensee's revenue
are different bases of royalty calculation, and they may be adopted for
different concerns in licensing transactions. 3 2 3 Theoretically, if the
licensor seeks more predictability and certainty, it will usually choose
a fixed sum royalty. 324 By contrast, if the licensor expects exceptional
success in the licensee's products, it is more likely to adopt a royalty
structure based on a percentage of sales rather than an up-front flat
sum.
The royalty structure in the 2007 IDC/Apple license does suggest
that IDC was not expecting iPhone to become one of the top two players

Id.
319.
320.
Id.
321.
The license agreement was part of the settlement of patent infringement dispute
between IDC and Samsung. Therefore, although it was signed in 2009, the licensing period started
retroactively from 2007. See id.
322.
The Huawei court obtained this number from reports produced by Strategy Analytics.
According to Strategy Analytics, Samsung's revenue from its mobile products were USD$24.213
billion in 2007, USD$26.222 billion in 2008, USD$27.478 billion in 2009, USD$33.034 billion in
2010, and USD$45.194 billion in 2011. Strategy Analytics estimated that Samsung's revenue from
mobile products in 2012 would be USD$53.61 billion. See id.
323.

See, e.g., GOMULKIEWICZ ET AL., supra note 315, at 68.

324.

Id.
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in the global market. 325 As a fixed sum and a percent of sales are two
different royalty schemes based on different concerns, it is not
appropriate for the courts to decide the FRAND rate between Huawei
and IDC directly based on the above-mentioned rate of 0.0187 percent.
Given the significant difference between the times of the transactions,
the expected profits of the standard implementers, and the base of
royalty rates, the fixed amount set in the 2007 IDC/Apple agreement is
not interchangeable with a certain percentage of Apple's iPhone
revenue calculated by the court.
This is not to say that the Huawei courts should not consider the
royalty that Apple paid to IDC for the determination of the FRAND
rate. Apple/IDC is definitely an important reference in this case.
However, instead of calculating the ratio of SEP royalty and Apple's
revenue from iPhone, the courts should investigate the factors that
influenced the determination of the $56 million royalty, and how these
factors can be applied in the Huawei/IDC negotiation.
C. Timing of the Hypothetical Negotiations
The timing for the hypothetical negotiation between the SEP
holder and the standard implementer is occasionally quite important
for the determination of a FRAND rate. Nonetheless, this issue was not
recognized in Huawei.326 Although FRAND enforcement has different
roots in US law and Chinese law, 32 7 the timing for the hypothetical
negotiation is a common issue shared by both jurisdictions in the
determination of a FRAND rate. Therefore, relevant discussions in the
US cases may benefit Chinese courts in framing this issue in the future.
In Microsoft v. Motorola, the Ninth Circuit did not take into
consideration the timing of hypothetical negotiations between the two
parties because "the alleged breach of contract was not tied to any
specific date," and such breach may be found "based on Motorola's offer
letters, its seeking a number of injunctions, or its overall course of
conduct." 328 However, scholars have various opinions regarding the
timing of the hypothetical negotia.tion. Some believe that it should be
See, e.g., Arjun Kharpal, iPhone 6 Pushes Apple to Top Spot, Tied with Samsung,
325.
CNBC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/01/29/iphone-6-pushes-apple-to-numberJoe Rossignol,
[https://perma.cc/35LG-92LD];
1-smartphone-maker-tied-with-samsung.html
iPhone Continues to Increase in U.S. Smartphone Market Share Ahead of "iPhone 6s" Debut,
MACRUMORS (Sept. 3, 2015, 10:48 AM), http://www.macrumors.com/2015/09/03/iphone-us-marketshare-comscore-2015/ [https://perma.cc/6NHT-2LZ3].
326.
Huawei Jishu Youxian Gongsi Su Jiaohu Shuzi Tongxin Youxian Gongsi
014i&BWiME1i@ [Huawei Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Communications, Inc. (Huawei
(iM
v. IDC)], 2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305 (Guangdong High People's Ct. 2013) (China).
See supranotes 67-91 and accompanying text.
327.
328.
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1042 (9th Cir. 2015).
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the time when the subject technology is adopted as a standard; 329 others
suggest a later time for the hypothetical negotiation, which is "a time
when both SEP holders and standard implementers have made a sunk
investment." 330 The advantage of having a single point of time for the
hypothetical negotiation is that it provides more certainty for the
FRAND rate determination. 331
As Judge Robart held in Microsoft v. Motorola, and as many
others argued, a FRAND royalty should represent only the value of the
patented invention, rather than the "hold-up" value that may result
from a better deal after a standard has been chosen. 332 Some
researchers suggested as well that to determine a FRAND rate, courts
should replicate the bargain before a standard is adopted and calculate
the ex ante value. 33 3 As patent holders cannot leverage the standard or
need to compete with each other to be included in the standard, the
royalty rate before or at the time of adoption should be closest to a
FRAND one. 334 This approach was adopted by Judge Robart in
Microsoft,3 3 5 which held that FRAND rates would be based on the SSO's

evaluation of alternatives for the patented technology and the goal of
promoting pervasive adoption. 336 Thus, he ruled that the time to

329.
See, e.g., Contreras & Gilbert, A Unified Frameworkfor RAND, supranote 3, at 149 193; Cotter, supra note 3, at 358.
330.
See Geradin, The Meaning of "Fairand Reasonable", supra note 6, at 949.
331.

See, e.g., Lim, Standard Essential Patent, supra note 1, at 42.

332.
See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C1O-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at
*12, *19 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013); see also Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913
(N.D. Ill. 2012); Mark R. Patterson, Inventions, Industry Standards, and Intellectual Property, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1043, 1048 (2002); supra note 42 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Bonadio, supra note 8, at 35-36; Carlton & Shampine, Economic
333.
Interpretationof FRAND, supra note 3, at 545; Contreras, Fixing FRAND, supra note 2, at 56;
Cotter, supra note 3, at 358; Michael G. Cowie & Joseph P. Lavelle, Patents Covering Industry
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determine the value of SEPs was at the time of adoption, rather than
the time of infringement. 337 On the other hand, those who argue that
the timing should be set after the adoption of the standard aim to
capture the full commercial value of the subject SEPs. 3 3 8 They contend
that parties may lack full understanding of such value before the
technology is adopted by the standard. 339
This study supports the viewpoint that an ideal timing to
determine the FRAND rate in the hypothetical negotiation should not
be the time after the subject patented technology is adopted in the
standard. Lock-in and hold-up problems, which give undue leverage to
patent holders, are more likely to occur after relevant patents are
adopted by the standard and become SEPs. 340 To put it differently, a
hypothetical negotiation before the technology was adopted as part of
the standard does not reflect the patent holder's ability to hold up
licenses. Once a patent becomes a SEP, standard implementers have
no choice but to employ this SEP, and competition from other competing
technologies is removed right away from the market. 34 1
When IDC licensed those SEPs to Apple in 2007, it had not
joined ETSI, nor had it made the FRAND commitment. 342 IDC could
not charge the "hold-up" value in the transaction. Such a fact may
provide a positive signal for the courts to determine the FRAND rate
based on the transaction between IDC and Apple. However, this does
not necessarily mean that the IDC/Apple transaction is a perfect
reference for a FRAND rate in terms of timing. The transaction taking
place too long ago may fail to reflect the real value and complete
commercial application of a technology. 343 Some scholars thus argue
that a reasonable royalty is based on a hypothetical negotiation
between the SEPs holder and the standard implementer when the SSO
is setting the standard. 344 The royalty rate should not be different for
implementers that adopt the standard at different times. 345 The timing
of the SSO setting the standard is crucial for the determination of a
FRAND rate because a reasonable royalty should "reflect what would
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happen as a result of well-informed ex ante technology competition." 346
Parties involved in the standard setting process are also informed of the
royalty for the second-best alternative. 347
Based on such
understanding, the IDC/Apple transaction may not be an ideal
indication for the hypothetical negotiation because at that time neither
party may be well informed about the technology competition and the
true value of the patented technology.
If such technology was
undervalued at that time, the Huawei court might have underestimated
the FRAND rate.
VI. CONCLUSION
Like most difficult IP controversies, disputes surrounding SEPs
and FRAND-encumbered patents concern the fundamental IP legal and
policy issues regarding the balance between incentives and access.
Given the complexities underlying the dynamics in standard setting
and adoption, it is no wonder that FRAND has left a variety of
disagreements between SEP holders and standard implementers.
Huawei no doubt testifies to China's active role in the global
communications industry as well as the court's growing ability to
handle complex patent litigation. As the country has become the world
factory for various ICT products, legal issues pertaining to FRANDencumbered SEPs come into play in the new phase of China's economic
and technological development.
China has carved out its own enforcement mechanism for
FRAND with strong civil law characteristics in Huawei. Good faith;
rather than the contractual relationship, has become standard
implementers' legal basis to enforce FRAND commitments against SEP
holders. Although Huawei identified most key factors to determine the
FRAND rate, its approach to rate calculation is less developed
compared to that of its counterparts in the United States. While it is
unclear whether the Chinese courts are tasked to implement the
government's
industrial
policy,
their
decisions
concerning
transnational patent disputes are having increasingly important effects
on the global high-tech industry.
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